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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF AID ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT;
THE ROLES OF GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL MARKET
DEVELOPMENT 
Karakaplan, Mustafa Uğur 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof Bilin Neyapti 
Co-supervisor: Asst. Prof Selin Sayek Böke
June 2005
This thesis investigates the effects of aid on foreign direct investment. The 
study takes into account the conditions such as sound governance within countries 
or well-developed financial markets, which are expected to effect this relationship. 
The hypothesis is that aid encourages foreign direct investment only where 
governance is of quality or financial markets are developed or both. The dynamic 
relationship is examined using an unbalanced panel data set, including 97 
countries over the period of 1960-2004, where available. The results of the 
empirical analysis confirm the hypothesis with strong evidence.
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ÖZET
İKTİSADİ YARDIMIN DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIMA ETKİLERİ: 
YÖNETİŞİM VE MALİ PİYASADAKİ GELİŞMENİN ROLÜ 
Karakaplan, Mustafa Uğur 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı 
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke
Haziran 2005
Bu tez iktisadi yardımın doğrudan yabancı yatırıma etkilerini araştırmaktadır. 
Çalışma ülkelerdeki iyi yönetişim veya gelişmiş mali piyasalar gibi bu ilişkiyi 
etkileyebilecek koşulları dikkate almaktadır. Hipotez, uluslararası iktisadi 
yardımın doğrudan yabancı yatırımı yalnızca yönetimi kaliteli veya mali 
piyasaları gelişmiş ya da her ikisinin de olduğu yerlerde teşvik edeceğidir. 
Dinamik ilişki, 97 ülkeyi ve 1960-2004 döneminin mümkün noktalarını kapsayan 
dengesiz panel veri kullanılarak İncelenmektedir. Araştırma sonuçları hipotezi 
güçlü delillerle desteklemektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İktisadi Yardım, Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırım
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................. iii
ÖZET............................................................................................................................ iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.................................................................................1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.................................................................... 7
2.1. Explaining FDI.................................................................................................7
2.1.1. Questioning FDI flows...........................................................................9
2.1.2. Methodologies to identify determinants of F D I................................ 10
2.1.3. Determinants of F D I............................................................................ 11
2.1.3.1. Economic related determinants.................................................. 12
2.1.3.2. Structural/Location related determinants...................................16
2.1.3.3. Other determinants.......................................................................19
2.2. Aid as a determinant of growth.................................................................... 21
2.2.1. Five premises on aid.............................................................................22
2.2.2. Necessary conditions for effectiveness of a id ................................... 25
2.2.3. Aid to investment causality.................................................................31
CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY......................................................34
3.1. Hypotheses.....................................................................................................34
3.2. Data and the variables................................................................................... 40
3.3. Methodology..................................................................................................44
CHAPTER 4; REGRESSION ANALYSIS............................................................. 48
4.1. Models........................................................................................................... 48
4.2. Regression results..........................................................................................62
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.................................................................................. 67
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................70
V
APPENDICES............................................................................................................. 80
Appendix A; List of abbreviations, derivations, and sources of data............. 80
Appendix B; Explanatory data averages.............................................................83
Appendix C: Cross correlations........................................................................... 92
Appendix D: Regression results with human capital........................................93
VI
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1: Variables in models and their expected effects on FD I........................ 39
Table 4.1.1; Regression results of the basic model (4.1.1)......................................50
Table 4.1.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.2) with MA31nGDPpc............52
Table 4.1.3; Regression results of the model (4.1.3) with MA31nGDPpc............54
Table 4.1.4.1; Regression results of the model (4.1.4) withMA31nGDPpc.........56
Table 4.1.4.2; Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA31nGDPpc.......... 57
Table 4.1.4.3: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA31nGDPpc.......... 58
Table 4.1.4.5: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA31nGDPpc..........60
Table 4.1.4.6; Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA31nGDPpc..........61
Appendix Table B. 1; Explanatory data averages of continents..............................83
Appendix Table B.2: Explanatory data averages of countries................................ 83
Appendix Table D. 1: Regression results of the model (4.1.2) with M A 3EK..... 93
Appendix Table D.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.3) with M A3HK..... 94
Appendix Table D.3.1; Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK ... 95 
Appendix Table D.3.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK ... 96 
Appendix Table D.3.3: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK ... 97 
Appendix Table D.3.4: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK ... 98 
Appendix Table D.3.5; Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK ... 99 
Appendix Table D.3.6: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK . 100
VI1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Through the ages, mankind has been investing inter-regionally. 
Mesopotamian, Greek, and Phoenician merchants of about 6000 years ago, are 
ancestors of today’s multinational investors. The well-known great colonies of 
those days, such as Carthage, Corinth, Miletus, Rhodes, Syracuse, Tyre and Sidon 
were settled by the inhabitants of overcrowded cities who sought profit in less 
developed territories and henee established in these lands to trade jewelry, pearls, 
coral, leather, wool, spices and slaves. (Phatak, 1971). In 2500 B.C., Sumerian 
merchants was building outposts in order to obtain, to stock and to trade their 
goods. (Wilkins, 1970).
Civilizations of the old world witnessed the peak of this earliest “global” 
trading system in the sixth century B.C.. However, with the rise of the Greek 
Empire and the Roman empire, the system started to deeline. In the Middle Ages, 
feudalism constituted autonomous units of economies and restricted the trade 
which resulted in a “non-global” world. On the other hand, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, 
and Venice became crusade depots and controlled remotely, and financial 
institutions had emerged during the Crusades. Also, a new type of commercial 
organization, named commenda, had arisen in 1450s. Commenda was an 
agreement between a financier at home and a distant merchant on accomplishment
of a specific commission. Despite its temporary nature, the commenda led the 
multifaceted system of mercantilism. (Phatak, 1971).
Throughout the mercantilist period world had been dominated by British, 
French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and Belgian colonists. Export-import houses 
and commercial agencies were founded in distant locations to serve home 
countries. Moreover, barriers to trade, price regulations and production quotas of 
contemporary world was bom in the mercantilist era. The invention of steam 
power brought the Industrial Revolution resulting in the demise of mercantilism 
and the rise of laissez faire. In the nineteenth century, spread of the new 
technology in Europe changed the pattern of global trade considerably. Raw 
materials were not sufficient for the boosted production of the new factories, and 
thus, industrialized countries made permanent direct investments in their colonies 
located in Africa, America and Asia. (Phatak, 1971).
In the late nineteenth century the colonial system started to fall down, and 
the system collapsed in the mid-twentieth century. Meanwhile the world has 
confronted the rise of nationalism, the two world wars, and afterwards came the 
Great Depression and the appearance of Communist bloc of nations. The 
emergence of voluntary organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the GATT agreement in 1947 were also events of this later period. All 
these happenings play an important role in the growth of foreign direct investment. 
(Phatak, 1971).
In the book “A Short History of the International Economy since 1850”, 
Ashworth (1987) states that the accumulated total British international 
investments was 200 million pound sterling in the beginning of the nineteenth
century, 2.4 billion pound sterling at the end of the nineteenth century, and before 
the First World War, it was presented to be 4 billion UK pounds. Ashworth (1987) 
also reports 15 billion French Franc of total French foreign investment by 1880; 
25 billion Deutsche Mark of total German foreign investment in 1914; and 2.6 
billion US dollars of accumulated total foreign investment of USA by 1914.
Wilkins (1974) presents that while USA foreign direct investment (FDI) at 
the end of 1910s was 3.9 billion US dollars, it was 7.6 billion US dollars at the 
end of 1920s. Wilkins (1974) also give an account of US capital net outflows for 
direct investment in 1946 is 0.2 billion US dollars and it is 0.6 billion dollars in 
1950, 1.67 billion dollars in 1960 and 4.4 billion dollars in 1970.
According to World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, in the 
beginning of 1970s world total net inflows of FDI was more than 8.5 billion US 
dollars which constituted 0.45 percent of the world’s GDP. In 1980, it was 57.4 
billion US dollars which was 0.5 percent of world’s GDP and in 1990, it was 
more than 200 billion US dollars corresponding to 0.95 percent of world’s GDP. 
By the year 2000, total net inflows of FDI worldwide had reached to 1511 billion 
US dollars, representing 4.9 percent of world’s GDP. In “Global Development 
Finance” (2000) the World Bank also shows that for middle income or low 
income countries, average of foreign direct investment to GDP ratio over 1990s 
was increasing.
From the time when the earliest known inter-regional investment activities, 
6000 years has passed, foreign investment has evolved in the course of several 
phases, and the world finally has developed FDI as an instrument of international 
capital flows. Today, the importance of FDI can be captured from the significant
increase in the share of FDI in GDP. However, the literature could grasp the 
meaning of FDI only in the recent epoch. As Duiming (1993) states, even though 
there are studies on foreign investment before 1960s such as Iversen (1935) or 
Southard et al. (1936), the literature delves into FDI only after 1960s.
Contemporary studies on FDI, such as Borensztein et al. (1998), 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), Mencinger (2003), Makki and Somwaru (2004), 
Asheghian (2004) and Alfaro et al. (2003), search the effects of FDI on growth 
and development, and potential returns from FDI. Moreover, the recognition of 
the FDI as an important investment instrument and interest on the variables which 
allure or divert FDI, motivate the research to focus on the determinants of FDI. 
Through this process various determinants of FDI are asserted in the studies such 
as Root and Ahmed (1978), Nigh (1986), Hein (1992), Singh and Jun (1995), and 
Albuquerque et al. (2003).
While there is no consensus on the effects of most of the declared 
determinants in the literature, the majority of the studies agree on positive 
consequences of a few factors on FDI, such as market size or openness to trade. 
Although the literature proposes lots of variables as determinants of FDI, aid is 
rarely mentioned as a factor that affects FDI. Root and Ahmed (1978) and Blaise 
(2005) are examples of a few studies where aid is proposed to determine FDI. 
However, the former study concluded no relationship, and the latter study cannot 
be generalized due to its micro orientation. In this thesis, it is argued that aid can 
be an important determinant of FDI due to its signaling property, in the sense that 
when aid flows to a country, this may also indicate opportunities for FDI.
When aid data^ is analyzed, it can be seen that world’s total official 
development assistance (ODA) in 1970 is 6.9 billion US dollars equal to 0.2 
percent of world’s GDP, and in the mid 1990s the figure jumps up to 68 billion 
US dollars of aid transfers keeping importance at 0.2 percent of world’s GDP. 
Significance of aid as a transfer of resources and the increase in the amount of aid 
are obvious, and hence aid cannot elude research. Recent studies such as Boone 
(1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Tavares (2003) 
scrutinize the significance of effects of aid on economic and development 
indicators, and also question whether the effect of aid is subject to some 
development factors. For instance, in a World Bank policy research report, 
namely “Assessing Aid” (1998), aid is presented to be more prolific on economic 
growth and development in countries with well developed policies.
However, aid literature generally concentrates on the causality from aid to 
domestic investment and growth. The importance of this study arises at this point. 
This research project builds the bridge the link between aid and FDI in order to 
close the gap in the literature. The underlying value of this study is that in 
exploring the effect of aid on FDI, necessary conditions such as sound 
management within countries and developed financial markets, which are 
expected to effect this relationship, are also taken into account. The main 
hypothesis is that aid promotes FDI inflows where quality of governance is high 
or financial markets are well developed or both. If there are obstacles in the 
economy such as political instability or weak financial background, the effect of 
aid on FDI is expected not to be necessarily positive. The dynamic relationship is
Source: WDI Online.
investigated utilizing an unbalanced panel data set, consisting of 97 countries over 
the period of 1960-2004, where available. The computer software Ox version 3.10 
is used in the model estimations. The results of empirical analysis provide robust 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis.
This outline of the study is as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
FDI and aid. Chapter 3 is on data and methodology, presenting basic and 
appended models, hypothesis on these models, sources of data, and the 
econometric methodology utilized in the study. Chapter 4 provides model 
specifications and results of the regression analysis of the dynamic models of FDI. 
Chapter 5 makes concluding remarks and states policy implications.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews two strands of literature related to the subject of this 
study. The first part of the literature is on foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
defines FDI and identifies the detemiinants of FDI. Since the literature is too 
extensive to cover entirely, a brief summary of this literature is presented in 
Section 2.1, where FDI is defined thoroughly, and traditional and recent theories 
on FDI are reviewed. The second part of the literature is on aid and its 
macroeconomic effects. This literature investigates the relationships among aid, 
growth and domestic investment, and controls for the effectiveness of aid flows. 
The effectiveness of aid depends heavily on the quality of state institutions, 
policies or financial markets, which form a list of necessary conditions in 
recipient economies to benefit from aid flows. Section 2.2 provides an account of 
the literature on the relationship aid and development of institutions and financial 
markets. In light of FDI and aid sections.
2.1. Explaining FDI
Dunning (1993) identifies foreign direct investment, as investment made 
beyond the borders of the home country of a multinational company (MNC), 
which is a corporation investing in more than one country and controlling these
investments. The investment contains assets and intermediate products, such as 
new technology, vintage capital, high management skills. Calvo et al. (1996), 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997), Alfaro et al. (2003) and Deichmaim et al. (2003) 
all mention the important role of MNC activities on home and host economies. 
From a view of developing country, Appleyard and Field (1998) goes over the 
main points of potential benefits from FDI as increase in output, wages, 
employment, exports and tax revenues, achievement of scale economies, 
provision of new technology and managerial skills, and weakening of power of 
domestic monopoly. Additionally, from the view of a MNC, Galego et al. (2004) 
and Buch et al. (2005) summarizes the advantages of FDI, as getting closer to a 
new consumer market, shortening the distance to the existing clients, and 
minimizing production costs.
The proportion of FDI in world GDP is growing continuously and 
economies are aware of all these facts and the importance of FDI long before. 
Even so, as Dunning (1993) emphasizes, prior to the 1960s, there was no 
development in the theory of MNCs or FDI. Dunning (1993) talks about the early 
attempts of Iversen (1935) on the theory of capital movements; Southard (1931), 
Southard et al. (1936), Barlow (1953) and Dunning (1958) on empirical and 
country specific determinants of FDI; Williams (1929) on modification of 
neoclassical theories of trade because of internationalization; and Plummer (1934), 
Penrose (1956, 1958) and Bye (1958) on advantages of horizontal and vertical 
integration. Numerous research has been conducted on MNCs and FDI only after 
1960s, and at the present time, there is a vast literature on FDI.
In 2.1.1. three questions regarding the flows of FDI are explored. 2.1.2.
presents the categories of methodologies utilized in the literature to identify the
determinants of FDI.
2.1.1. Questioning FDI flows
According to Singh and Jun (1995) the entire FDI literature deals with three 
specific questions; First, why national companies turn into MNCs; second, why 
companies locate production abroad rather than licensing or exporting; and third, 
why FDI flows heterogeneously across countries. By the early 1970s, the 
conjecture on the first two of these questions was developed in the literature with 
the convergence of the theories of Hymer (1960) and Vernon (1966). However, 
there were still gaps in the theory and the third question on location determinants 
o f FDI was remaining unanswered.
Dunning’s (1973) ownership-location-intemalization (OLI) paradigm 
became a turning point. The comprehensive study was analyzing the eclectic 
paradigm of international production within four conditions: the level of 
ownership-specific (0) advantages, the level of market internalization (I) 
advantages, the extent of location-specific (L) advantages and the extent of 
foreign production. Duxming (1993) presents these OLI factors. Several 0-factors 
such as know-how or innovatory capacity, and many I-factors such as control over 
market outlets or avoidance of search and negotiation costs are identified in 
Dunning (1993). Besides 0-factors and I-factors, various L-factors are stated 
some of which are the distribution of resource endowments and markets, input 
prices, quality and productivity, transport and communication cost, investment
incentives, barriers to trade, social and infrastructural provisions, cross-country 
differences and system of government. Nonetheless, Dunning (1973) does not 
justify the importance of L factors.
2.1.2. Methodologies to identify determinants of FDI
The empirical studies that focused on identifying the determinants of FDI 
followed different approaches. Singh and Jun (1995) groups these methodologies 
into three categories: micro oriented econometric methodology, survey data 
methodology, and aggregate econometric methodology.
Micro oriented econometric methodology is employed in the company or 
industry level and inspects to identify industry-specific factors. Kogut and Singh 
(1988), Blomstrom and Zejan (1991), Woodward and Rolfe (1993), Asiedu and 
Esfahani (1998), Smarzynska and Wei (2001), Buch et al. (2005) are examples of 
firm-level micro oriented studies. This methodology may give valuable results at 
industry level, however generalization of the factors to the overall economy may 
not be possible.
Survey data methodology utilizes the data analyzing the incentives of MNCs 
in order to discover the quality factors, but the results are subject to limitation of 
the survey structure and instruments. Rolfe et al. (1993), and Zhang and Yuk 
(1998) are studies representing survey data methodology.
Aggregate econometric methodology analyzes the data at the 
macroeconomic level to determine the country-specific factors, aggregate 
determinants and long-run trends. Examples of these determinant can be 
development of financial markets within a coimtry, international business cycle
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volatilities, market size and market power. Root and Ahmed (1978), Nigh (1986), 
Hein (1992), Singh and Jun (1995), and Albuquerque et al. (2003) all utilize 
aggregate econometric methodology and assess aggregate determinants of FDI. 
Following sections give an account to almost all of these determinants proposed in 
the literature.
2.1.3. Determinants of FDI
Even though several determinants of FDI are identified and grouped in the 
aid literature, there hardly is an agreement on significance or on signs of the 
coefficients. Calvo et al. (1996) classifies the promoting and hampering 
determinants of FDI into two groups: Factors external to the receivers of FDI and 
factors internal to them. Six external factors are described as: the changes in world 
interest rates, the fluctuations in international business cycle, international 
diversification of investment, relations with external creditors, adoption of 
sensible policies and reforms, and externalities or contagion effects. The 
importance of internal factors is also mentioned with the sound domestic 
fundamentals, but these fundamentals are not stated explicitly.
Lall et al. (2003) refers to a recent categorization of the determinants of FDI 
in Tsai (1991) and Ning and Reed (1995) which is similar to that of Calvo et al. 
(1996). Two groups of influencing factors are stated: demand-side or pulling 
factors, and supply-side or pushing factors. From the viewpoint of the FDI 
receiving country, drawing FDI depends on pulling factors which are interest rates, 
tax and tariff levels, economic size and market growth rate, quality of governance, 
distance from the origin of FDI, wage rate, literacy rate, cultural similarities and
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all other investment attractors. From the aspect of investing country or company, 
FDI activity depends on pushing factors which are market power, product life 
cycle, economies of scale, intangible assets, technical and managerial expertise, 
patent and brand rights, access to credit, and all other motivators of investment. In 
a separate categorization, Lall et al. (2003) groups the variables into two major 
classes. The first class is called economic related variables and includes six 
categories of variables: Market size, cost differentials, interest rates, exchange 
rates, fiscal policies and trade policies. The second class of determinants in Lall et 
al. (2003) is named as structural/location related variables and contains five 
categories of factors: physical distance, psychic distance, education level, state of 
infrastructure and political quality.
In the following. Section 2.1.3.1 presents the economic related variables 
class of Lall et al. (2003) and refers to studies controlling these variables. In 
Section 2.1.3.2, structural/location related variables class in Lall et al. (2003) are 
specified and many exampling results on these variables are cited. The current 
study will focus on the latter categorization concentrating on the economic and 
structural/location related variables. Section 2.1.3.3 states the rest of the 
determinants mentioned in the literature, which are not stated explicitly in Lall et 
al. (2003).
2.1.3.1. Economic related determinants
First of all, MNCs’ aim to accomplish scale economies and spread the cost 
is related to the market size of the host country. Larger markets would provide 
better incentives to MNCs in this sense. Since expectations of future market size
12
is derived from market growth rate, this rate can also be a determinant of FDI 
flows. Using several variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per 
capita and GDP growth, positive relationship is supported by Root and Ahmed 
(1978), Scaperlanda and Balough (1983), Nigh (1986), Ning and Reed (1995), 
Love and Lage-Hidago (2000), Deichmann et al. (2003), Janicki and Wunnava 
(2004) as well as by Smarzynska and Wei (2001), Lall et al. (2003) and 
Albuquerque et al. (2003). However, Bollen and Jones (1982) present that sign of 
the coefficient of potential market or population changes according to different 
estimation methods. Additionally, Filippaios et al. (2003) finds out that different 
time series or cross country data sets would report results contrary to the literature 
such as insignificant or negatively significant market size coefficients.
Secondly, Dunning (1993) emphasizes the importance of cost differentials 
of mobile factors of production on FDI flows. Relatively lower cost resources 
such as raw materials or labor in host country can positively influence FDI 
decisions. While Love and Lage-Hidago (2000), Janicki and Wunnava (2004), 
Lall et al. (2003), Albuquerque et al. (2003) and Smarzynska and Wei (2001) 
employ relative labor costs and provide evidence for negative relation between 
labor costs and FDI inflows; Ning and Reed (1995), and Giulietti et al. (2004) do 
not verify the hypothesis.
Thirdly, according to the neoclassical capital arbitrage theory of portfolio 
investment, international capital maximizes its returns by flowing to locations 
where interest rates are relatively high. Hence a positive relationship between 
interest rates and FDI is expected. Albuquerque et al. (2003) validate this 
expectation whereas Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000) find no evidence of interest
13
rates and FDI relationship. Also King and Reed (1995) reported that the large FDI 
flows of world today cannot be determined with attractive interest rate 
differentials.
Fourthly, appreciation of the comparative value of MNC’s home country 
currency would make investment abroad relatively inexpensive. Thus, FDI flows 
would increase with depreciation of host country’s currency and similarly 
decrease with appreciation. This negative relationship between exchange rates and 
FDI flows is reported by Aliber (1970). Tail et al. (2003), Froot and Stein (1992) 
and Love and Lage-Hidago (2000) also report that changes in relative exchange 
rate negatively affect FDI. Nevertheless, Blonigen (1997) states that the link is 
significant only for the sectors in which firm-specific assets are important such as 
manufacturing industry and Albuquerque et al. (2003) finds no significant 
relationship at all between the rate of currency depreciation and FDI. Ning and 
Reed (1995) propose the relative importance of exchange rate expectations, and 
imply that the significance of exchange rate is dependent on these expectations.
Fifthly, fiscal policy is stated to be another imported determinant of MNC 
activities in the literature. Tight fiscal policy, which hinders the income or profits 
of the MNC through high tax rates or other artificial blocks, would decrease FDI. 
Culem (1988) proposes a parallel idea in which tax rate on MNC’s income from 
local and global sales is a cost determinant of FDI. Root and Ahmed (1978) 
supports the idea that higher tax levels would discourage FDI activities. 
Albuquerque et al. (2003) uses ratio of public consumption to GDP as a proxy of 
overall tax burden, and obtain negative and significant results indicating that a rise 
in taxation and government consumption will deter FDI flows. Hines (1996)
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implies that the MNC activities are very dependent on the tax policies. Mutti and 
Grubert (2004) presents the negative sensitivity of export oriented FDI to taxation, 
but in countries with high income per capita, the effect of tax on FDI is reported 
to be lesser, and over time, the elasticity of tax is shown to be increasing. Lall et al. 
(2003) supports negative relationship between tax and FDI in two sets of data, 
however for other sets of the study the relationship is found to be insignificant. 
Also Smarzynska and Wei (2001) shows the insignifieant effect of corporate tax 
rates in host country.
Finally, trade policies effect FDI flows by many channels such as quotas, 
tariffs or other barriers to trade. Host country’s degree of openness to trade is 
hypothesized to be a positive determinant of FDI decisions in the literature. 
Deichmann (2001) proposes the international trade as the most important 
determinant of the investment. Janicki and Wunnava (2004) empirically proves 
this hypothesis by presenting the high and positively significant relationship 
between the quantity of imports and FDI. Galego et al. (2004) use the ratio of 
external trade to gross domestic product (GDP) and support the idea of trade and 
FDI being complements. Smarzynska and Wei (2001) employs residuals from a 
regression of external trade to GDP, and they also find that there is a positive 
relationship. Nevertheless, Filippaios et al. (2003) finds out that ratio of exports to 
external trade is a negative determinant of US FDI. They explain that the negative 
significant effect of openness to trade is due to prior interest of US FDI which is 
to supply to local market.
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First, physical distance is an important factor since transportation, 
communication and managerial costs may effect FDI decisions. Closer host 
countries may attracts more FDI than those which are far away from the source 
countries and a negative relationship may exists between the extent of physical 
distance and FDI flows. The shortest linear measure of the distance between host 
country and USA is used as a proxy for physical distance in Tail et al. (2003) and 
a significant negative relationship is reported. Also Smarzynska and Wei (2001) 
used logarithm of distance in kilometers between capital cities of home and host 
countries and support the negative relationship between distance and FDI flows.
Secondly, psychic distance, which is the degree of cultural differences 
between countries, determines the MNC activities because cultural and linguistic 
similarities between host and home countries may support FDI flows into host 
countries, and conversely, gaps in cultures would impede FDI. Therefore there is 
a negative relationship between psychic distance and FDI. Zhang and Yuk (1998) 
shows that cultural similarities plays a positive role in FDI decisions. Tail et al. 
(2003) also presents that English speaking countries are more likely to receive US 
FDI.
Thirdly, education level in the host country reflects the development of the 
country. MNCs would invest in countries with higher education levels and as a 
result, higher technical skills of human capital. Hence, education level is a 
positive determinant of FDI. Education level is indicated with literacy rate in Lall 
et al. (2003) and positive relation is shown empirically. Deichman et al. (2003) 
uses student per teacher ratio to capture the education level, and finds negative
2.1.3.2. Structural/Location related determinants
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relation between this ratio and FDI flows which implies education level’s positive 
influence on FDI.
Fourthly, state of infrastructure is another variable revealing the economic 
development. A well developed infrastructure in a host country creates a more 
productive environment for MNCs and thus a positive relationship between level 
of infrastructure and FDI flows exists. Root and Ahmed (1978) confirms that 
volume of commerce, transportation and communication is positively effectual on 
FDI. Bollen and Jones (1982) uses energy consumption to capture the effects of 
development in infrastructure and finds significant results. In Lall et al. (2003), as 
a proxy for infrastructure, the number of passenger cars per square mile is utilized. 
Significant effect of this proxy on FDI flows is presented telling the positive 
influence of infrastructure development on FDI. Deichmann et al. (2003) utilize 
percentage of paved roads as a proxy to transportation infrastructure and reports 
positive relationship.
Finally, political stability or governance quality is a very important factor 
which play role in the decisions of MNCs. Countries at risk or in a state of 
instability has distracting effect on FDI because of gaps in economic policies, and 
additional cost and increased risks of investments. For this reason higher levels of 
political stability and governance quality pull more FDI. Lall et al. (2003) 
employs the political right’s index, which is proposed by Gastil (1983-1994) as a 
proxy to level of political stability, and finds supporting results. Root and Ahmed 
(1978) supports the hypothesis that high levels of regular executive transfers, 
which is described as a change of executives in the national office with 
conventional, legal or customary forces, distract FDI inflows. Nigh (1986) uses
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four political events variables of Azar and Sloan (1975); namely conflicting 
international events, co-operative international events, conflicting domestic events 
and co-operative domestic events. His results present that conflicting domestic 
events and first lag of conflicting international events have negative and 
significant influence on FDI, whereas co-operative domestic events and first lag 
of co-operative international events have positive significant effects. Singh and 
Jun (1995) employs political risk index developed by Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence and finds a positive relation between FDI and stability. Smarzynska 
and Wei (2001) uses two measures of corruption indices and prove negative effect 
of corruption on FDI decisions. Janicki et al. (2004) finds that healthy investment 
environments by means of macroeconomic and political stability is favored by 
MNCs. Brada et al. (2004) shows that when compared to similar regions, although 
Balkans would be expected to receive higher FDI inflows, conflict and instability 
caused lower rates of FDI.
The literature also includes studies in which quality of policy is presented to 
have weak or no effects on FDI. Bollen and Jones (1982) reports weak effects of 
political instability on FDI. They use four types of political instability of Taylor 
and Hudson (1976), which are political assassinations, coups, armed attacks, and 
deaths from domestic violence. It is found that there is weak or even no relation 
between political instability and FDI flows. Moreover, Albuquerque et al. (2003) 
presents that the relationship between the strength of property rights, absence of 
corruption and quality of governance have no significant effect on FDI inflows.
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Literature on FDI has numerous additional determinants of FDI and several 
types of categorization similar to those of Calvo et al. (1996) and Lall et al. 
(2003)’s. For instance, Root and Ahmed (1978) classifies 44 determinants of FDI 
into four groups: economic, social, political and policy determinants. In addition 
to the economic variables explained above, per capita growth rate, ratio of exports 
to imports, ratio of raw material exports to GDP, international liquidity, 
purchasing power parity, ratio of banking system claims on economy and on 
private sector to GDP and degree of economic integration are counted in Root and 
Ahmed (1978) as potential economic determinants of FDI. Share of banking 
system claims to GDP is used as the indicator of financial development and it 
measures local credit demonstrating financial depth. Deichmann et al. (2003) 
includes the share of banking credits in the total economic activity in the 
explanatory set and conveys on positive relationship between financial 
development and FDI inflows. Albuquerque et al. (2003) uses ratio of private 
credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP to measure 
financial depth’s effect on FDI and obtains positive and significant coefficients.
Root and Ahmed (1978) counts many other potential determinants such as 
modernization of outlook and strength of labor movement in social factors; 
frequency of government changes, number of internal armed attacks, level of 
administrative efficiency, level of nationalism, per capita foreign aid from US and 
non-US sources, and colonial affiliation in political factors; and tax incentives, 
attitude towards joint ventures, local content requirement, and limitation on 
foreign personnel in policy factors. Nevertheless non of these potential
2.1.3.3. Other determinants
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determinants are found to be significant. Albuquerque et al. (2004) also controls 
for the global variables such as world stock market return, US yield curve slope, 
world growth, and US credit spread; and the local variables some of which are 
real effective exchange rate (REER) volatility, GDP growth volatility, terms of 
trade (ToT) volatility, and balance of payments (BoP) restrictions. While US yield 
curve slope, world growth, GDP growth volatility and BoP restrictions are 
reported to be negative and significant, world stock market return, US credit 
spread, REER volatility and ToT volatility , are not found to be significant.
Geographical locations of host terrains also exist in the literature as 
determinants of FDI. Consequences of coastal location and landlocked location on 
MNC activities is investigated in Chien (1996) and Deichmann et al. (2003). Both 
studies find that accessibility to the sea is positively related to the FDI flows.
Recent empirical studies on FDI also include agglomeration effects which 
gives valuable information about host country’s environment. The lagged values 
of FDI is a generally accepted proxy for agglomeration to explain current amount 
of FDI. Singh and Jun (1995) explains the necessity to insert lagged values of FDI 
inflows with the time required to adjust to desired levels depending the conditions 
surrounding MNCs and regression results shows that stock adjustment models 
should be used. Deichmann et al. (2003) also utilizes lagged FDI in order to 
capture agglomeration factors and finds out the positive and significant returns of 
lagged FDI.
What is very odd in literature is that, under various collections of variables, 
among the crowd of FDI determinants, aid of any kind hardly comes into stage as 
a factor of FDI. In Root and Ahmed (1978), per capita foreign aid is mentioned as
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a potential determinant of FDI, however no significant relationship is reported. In 
Blaise (2005), Japanese FDI in People’s Republic of China (RPC) is modeled 
with Japanese ODA to RPC and a significant promoting effect of ODA on FDI is 
found. Yet, as mentioned earlier, since a micro oriented econometric methodology 
is employed in Blaise (2005), the results cannot be generalized. Lack of an 
aggregate econometric study on the link between aid and FDI constitutes an 
important gap in the economic literature and one of the main aims of this study is 
to construct the linkage from aid to FDI and fill this gap. With this aspiration, the 
literature where aid has been a determinant of some other economic variables are 
reviewed in the subsequent section.
2.2. Aid as a determinant of growth
Economic literature supplies several studies such as Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) or Hansen and Гагр (2001) which investigate the relationship between 
economic growth with aid. A few studies, for instance Easterly (2001) or Collier 
and Dollar (2004), also explicitly states aid as a determinant of domestic 
investment. However, to the best of our knowledge, the entire literature presents 
no example of an aggregate empirical study in which FDI is explained directly by 
aid. Hence, investigating this relationship is one of the contributions of this study 
to the literature.
Aid can be defined as donation of resources from one country to another 
country made with specific goals such as lessening poverty, supporting 
development, promoting welfare or improving growth in aid receiving country. 
There are various means of channeling aid to countries in need, with each means
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serving different objectives. However, as stated in Boone (1996), in those years 
when aid programs were first started, there was no theory or evidence whether aid 
can achieve these goals. Hence, these aid programs themselves became an 
economic experiment, and only after many years can studies build theories on 
effectiveness of aid. The early literature is very narrow studying only the direct 
causality from aid to growth; for example, Papanek (1972) presents a positive 
relationship between aid and growth, and Mosley et al. (1987) reports that the aid 
to growth relationship is not significant. Today, there is a relatively broad and 
satisfying literature on effectiveness of aid.
In view of the fact that the maximum effect is sought from aid transfers. 
Collier and Dehn (2001) stressed the scarcity of aid as the main reason of the 
development of “aid effectiveness” literature, since allocation of the resources 
becomes more important when they are very scant. Literature has built several 
controversial ideas to find answers to the questions related to the efficiency of aid.
In Section 2.2.1 five premises on aid and Collier’s (1999) investigation on 
these premises are presented. Section 2.2.2 briefly reviews the literature on aid 
and growth relationship and introduces the condition subjectivity of aid 
effectiveness concept. In Section 2.2.3, the literature dealing with the causality 
from aid to domestic investment is examined.
2.2.1. Five premises on aid
As the literature on aid started to develop, various propositions arise in the 
studies. Collier (1999) interrogates five common of these premises on aid under 
the idea of aid dependency. In the first premise, the magnitude of aid flows is
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discussed to be a significant factor in affecting the effectiveness of aid flows. This 
premise built on the proposal that slower growth in Africa relative to other 
continents could be a result of comparatively large amount of aid to African 
countries. High aid is accused to detriment policy in Africa, and harmed policy 
does not allow aid to be effective. However, Collier (1999) counters the reasoning 
of the slower growth rates in Africa with big amounts of aid beyond limits of 
efficiency with the evidence presented Collier and Dollar (2002) which indicates 
that the aid to African countries is below the level where it becomes destructive 
regardless of policy.
The second premise presents the similarities between the concepts of aid 
dependency and welfare dependency. Consequences of a welfare payment system, 
such as lost appetite to work because of being trapped in new welfare conditions, 
are proposed as potential results of high aid to poor countries. However, Collier 
(1999) argues that any parallel effects of aid to those of welfare dependency are 
unimportant and aid may even effect the will to work and invest positively.
The third premise asserts aid as unnecessary distracter in an environment 
dominated by private capital inflows and governments are advised to concentrate 
on attracting private investment since aid would be detrimental after certain 
degrees. Collier (1999) indicates that aid interacts in a relatively complex path as 
aid has an important role in formation of private capital flows and growth up to a 
level, and therefore suggests to program aid by taking into account of the private 
investment and economic growth.
In the fourth premise, the belief about aid being a source of instability in the 
economy because of its hypothetical volatile nature is mentioned. This belief is
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refuted in Collier (1999), in view of the statistical measures reporting that aid is 
not fickle, even more reliable than government revenues, and for this reason, aid 
is prescribed to be added in the budgets of where deficit prevails in order to 
sustain policy.
The fifth premise dooms aid to shrink on account of the evidence of donor 
fund retrenchments. Yet, Collier (1999) warns not to mix up the consequences of 
a phase in aid history to overall trend of aid. The simultaneous occurrence of 
cutback in aid supplies of USA and Western Europe is uttered to be an accident in 
the history, and such drops are advised not to be considered as the general 
tendency.
Many other studies also investigated these propositions. For instance, the 
negative returns from high aid flows in aid receiving countries which questions an 
idea parallel to one premise presented in Collier (1999) is inspected in Lensink 
and White (2001). In the study, negative returns from high aid flows are analyzed 
empirically and presents the idea with the aid Laffer curve. Studies such as Lavy 
and Sheffer (1991) or Sobhan (1996) are referred in order to explain diminishing 
returns to aid with absorption capacity of countries. But also, distortions in the 
policy resulting from high aid flows are mentioned as important on decreasing 
efficiency of aid. With a similar idea. Knack (2001) analyzes cross country data, 
to see whether higher levels of aid erode the governance, and presents empirically 
that the quality of policy is negatively effected with the aid. On the contrary, in 
the analysis of the relationship between aid and corruption, by employing physical 
and psychic distance to the aiding country as instrument variables Tavares (2003) 
finds that aid lessen the corruption. However, although there are several such
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studies examining the propositions mentioned in Collier (1999), aid literature 
seems to rather concentrated on the necessary conditions for aid to be effective on 
economic indicators.
2.2.2. Necessary conditions for effectiveness of aid
A recent study on the effectiveness of aid is Boone (1996). In this study, the 
importance of three political regimes, namely, egalitarian, elitist, and laissez-faire 
on effectiveness of aid is inspected. Boone (1996) defines two channels through 
which previous literature theorize aid to realize its proposed goals. In the first 
mechanism, the imperfect capital market is emphasized and aid is suggested to 
support projects which cannot be launched or finalized due to immobility of 
capital and insufficient domestic saving in developing countries. In the second 
channel, aid’s effect on fiscal policy is pointed out as in Barro (1990). Through 
this channel, aid lets the social planner cut taxes that distort investment, and hence, 
higher investment results in faster growth. However, since these channels strongly 
depend on political regimes, Boone (1996) studies the relationship between 
political regimes classified according to their interest groups and aid efficiency, 
and finds out that aid does not significantly effect growth, investment or 
development. Moreover aid is found to positively effectual on the size of 
government.
Boone (1996) is an important study in the literature, since aid is mentioned 
not to increase economic growth and development in a poor country. However, 
later studies such as Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), Lensink 
and White (1999) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) probe the results of Boone
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(1996). Although these four studies conclude that aid has positive effects on 
growth, Burnside and Dollar (2000) influenced not only the later studies and press, 
but also decisions of aid agencies and policymakers, relatively more than the rest 
including Boone (1996), because Burnside and Dollar (2000) focused on the 
hypothesis that the impact o f aid on economic growth is dependent on policies 
which are actually effective on growth and tested the hypothesis with an 
interactive measure of aid with quality of policy. In their study, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) state the importance of the policies in developing countries by 
referring to the studies of Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Fisher (1993) and Sachs 
and Warner (1995) where economic policies of a developing country are very 
effective on growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) defines aid as an income transfer 
which may promote economic growth if it is utilized in investment or may not 
effect growth if it is consumed. Thus, the efficiency of aid is defined as being 
dependent on the proportion of aid that is invested. Since the possibilities of 
investing some portion of aid, and returns of that investment depends on status of 
policy, Burnside and Dollar (2000) argues that economic growth can be explained 
with interaction terms of aid with quality of policy alongside aid, initial income, 
policy measures and other control variables. In Burnside and Dollar (2000), it is 
found that aid has a positive effect on growth in developing countries where 
sound fiscal, monetary and trade policies are in rule, and if the policies are 
defective, aid cannot be that effective. Accordingly, aid should be allocated to 
countries with sound policies, but Burnside and Dollar (2000) states that in 
actuality it is the opposite case in which aid does not go to good policy 
enviromnents.
26
However, as noted in Hudson (2004), the optimistic results of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) had much repercussions. Burnside and Dollar (2000) is generally 
criticized in the literature because of the changeability of results with different 
sets of sample and inexistence of shocks in the original model. Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) shows that utilizing the outliers in the model o f Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
affects the significance of the results presented in Burnside and Dollar (2000). In 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) terms used for the interaction between aid and policy in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and decreasing marginal returns to aid flows in 
Hadjimichal et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), and Lensink and White (1999) 
are analyzed. Contrary to findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) presents that aid is always positively effectual on growth rate 
irrespective of quality of policy, and nonlinearities, which are uncovered due to 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) misspecification, are important. Also, even though aid 
is not found to effect growth in models that include capital accumulation, the 
impact of aid on growth is verified through investment channel.
Another study that questions the sample dependent results of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) is Dalgaard and Hansen (2001). In this study, the data set utilized in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) is used to reassess the uncertain interaction between 
aid and policy. It is mentioned that with the sample selection procedure applied in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), there are possibilities to reach different conclusions.
In fact, the results in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) presents a substitute 
relationship between aid and good policy that good policy decrease the positive
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effectiveness of aid on growth claiming that the findings of Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) are not robust.^
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) questions whether good policy is effective 
on efficiency of aid, and declares many new environmental factors such as 
unsteadiness in the real value of exports and ToT trend, and climatic shocks, 
which are generally external to the economy and may concern aid effectiveness. 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) finds that the effect of aid on economic growth 
is not positive in every instance and effectiveness of aid strongly depends on 
environmental conditions. Negative effects of environmental shocks on growdh is 
found to be offset by aid, that is, aid is more efficient in countries in bad 
environmental conditions. Nevertheless, effectiveness of aid is not observed to be 
a function of goodness of policy. Moreover, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) 
shows that in actuality, the aid targeting pays attention to the desperation caused 
by exogenous environmental shocks but not to the quality of the policy.
Collier and Dehn (2001) also criticize Burnside and Dollar (2000) since their 
model does not include extreme shocks in their model. By inserting shocks in the 
model of Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dehn (2001) get significant 
results where shocks effect growth negatively in each choice of sample. Moreover, 
aid is found to be significantly counterbalancing the effects from shocks on 
growth. Therefore, rather than directing aid to good policy environments as 
suggested in Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dehn (2001) advise to target 
aid to the countries where impacts of an extreme negative shocks remain.
 ^Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) also introduces aid squared term to capture decreasing returns to aid, 
and notes a nonlinear relationship, which is parallel to the result in Hansen and Tarp (2001).
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However, it is shown that in real life, donors does not pay attention whether a 
country experiences a shock.
Rather than varying or extending Burnside and Dollar (2000) by inserting 
new variables to the model or diverting from the original sample selection 
mechanism. Easterly et al. (2003) only updates the original data set used in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) by filling in the holes in the set and adding four more 
years of observation and additional countries. With this new data set, by 
preserving the initial methodology. Easterly et al. (2003) rechecks the robustness 
of the results. Indeed, the expansion of the data set causes doubts on the outcomes 
of Burnside and Dollar (2000), in which aid affects growth in the existence of 
good policy, because results in Easterly et al. (2003) shows that interaction term 
of aid with policy is not significant any more with the new data set. Consequently, 
Easterly et al. (2003) counsels policymakers, international aid agencies and 
economists not to be much confident on results presented in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000).
In view of all comments on Burnside and Dollar (2000), Burnside and 
Dollar (2004) revisits the suggestion on aid and policy relationship. First, 
Burnside and Dollar (2004) mentions the inconsistencies in the literature, since 
some studies such as Hansen and Tarp (2001) find aid to be effectual in 
everywhere regardless of policy conditions, whereas some other studies such as 
Boone (1996) present aid as ineffective in any cases. Also, by presenting a figure 
on growth, aid and policy, Burnside and Dollar (2004) refutes the claims of 
Easterly et al. (2003) which is the denial of the conclusion in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) with an expansion in the original data set. Next, with a new data set, which
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only includes the observations from 90s, Burnside and Dollar (2004) tests three 
separate hypothesis: Aid promotes economic growth despite the quality of 
governance (unconditionality); aid does not promote economic growth in any 
conditions of governance (ineffectiveness); and aid promotes economic growth in 
case where governance, which effect growth positively, is well developed 
(conditionality). Burnside and Dollar (2004) finds that test results verily the 
proposition of Burnside and Dollar (2000) since conditionality hypothesis is found 
highly significant. Burnside and Dollar (2004) also concludes that the evidence on 
conditionality hypothesis is stronger than that of unconditionality hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, Burnside and Dollar (2004) cannot reject ineffectiveness hypothesis 
due to the fragility of statistical outcomes.
Putting aside the uncertain results on dependency of aid effectiveness on 
policy, Nkusu and Sayek (2004) search whether financial market development 
boost effectiveness of aid on economic growth. Nkusu and Sayek (2004) utilizes 
three financial indicators, namely liquid liabilities of the financial system, private 
sector credits, and bank credit, in order to capture the effect of the depth and 
development of financial markets on growth. Moreover, interaction terms of aid 
with these indicators are employed to catch the influence of financial market 
development on efficiency of aid on growth. Regression results present that 
interaction terms of aid with financial market development indicators are positive 
and significant, which support the hypothesis.
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2.2.3. Aid to investment causality
In addition to the studies where aid directly enters growth equations, the 
underlying idea which is the impact of aid on investment is analyzed explicitly in 
numerous studies. In an early study, Levy (1987) examines the relationship 
between concessionary aid flows and domestic investment rates in cross country 
set of forty six low income countries over a thirteen years of observation. Over 
this period, the existence of considerable dissimilarities in investment and saving 
rates among these forty six countries is presented to be comparatively stable. 
Moreover, in order to wipe out the effects of random shocks or cyclical variations 
on variables, averages over six years or more are used. The results support the 
hypothesis that concessionary aid leads investment in low income countries, and 
indeed the extend of effect of a rise in aid on investment rates is very high to 
conclude one to one and positive relationship between aid and domestic 
investment.
In Dollar and Easterly (1999) two keys to unlock growth potential of Africa 
are examined, which are aid to investment key and aid to policy key. The idea 
underlying the first key is that, since the domestic savings in Africa is too low to 
finance domestic investment, aid can be utilized as and investment financing tool, 
and so, increase in the investment rates effects the growth rate positively. With 
this hypothesis, in the regressions Dollar and Easterly (1999) explain domestic 
investment with aid, and growth with domestic investment using one year lagged 
variables and averages over four years. The finding show that aid financed 
investment key does not unlock growth since effect of aid on investment and 
effect of investment on growth in African countries are not found to be robust.
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In the book “The Elusive Quest for Growth”, Easterly (2001) first tells the 
success story of Ghanaians about the Akosombo Dam built on Volta River with 
the aid coming from World Bank, and American and British governments. 
Subsequently, the mechanism of aid-financed investment is clarified with Harrod 
- Domar model. In this model, aid fills the financing gap which occurs due to the 
lack of private investment in countries like Ghana. That is to say, aid helps to 
attain the target growth rates through investment. Next, the links from aid to 
investment and from investment to growth are controlled in the case of Zambia. 
The investment rates in Zambia before receiving large amounts of aid is stated to 
be high. However after getting the aid, investment rate in Zambia is pointed out to 
be decreasing and investment is not foimd to generate growth. Existence of 
similar cases such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe are also mentioned and hence 
the prediction of the model is presented to be weak.
Morrissey (2001) firstly analyzes the differences between two and three gap 
models and new growth models. It is stated that the gap models attribute 
temporariness to the impact of aid on economy, whereas new growth theory 
asserts the permanency of the effect. Yet, except one difference about the lifetime 
of aid’s effect, Morrissey (2001) finds the models very analogous on aid to growth 
mechanisms. Summary of these mechanisms also include the aid to investment 
causality in which aid is used in physical capital accumulation and human capital 
formation. In conclusion, the returns from aid is connected to the positive effects 
on productive investment, domestic savings, technology transfers and human 
capital development.
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In Collier and Dollar (2004) investment is regressed on several variables 
including initial gross national product (GNP) per capita, share of ODA in GDP as 
aid, square of aid, policy and interaction term of aid with policy. The data set in 
Collier and Dollar (2002) is utilized in the regression and the results give an 
account for the positive average stimulation of aid on investment. Negatively 
significant coefficient of aid squared term is reported to be the diminishing returns 
to aid. Policy term is not found to be significant; however, contrary to the 
suggestion of Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), interaction term of aid with policy is 
obtained to be positively significant, which indicates that aid and policy are found 
to be complements.
As summarized in this section, aid literature is dominated with the models in 
which economic growth and domestic investment are explained with aid. 
However, these models are good examples to derive ideas for an original model 
where aid determines FDI only in some specific circumstances. In view of the 
identifications and econometric models. Chapter 3 develops the novel model 
where aid is incorporated to identify FDI.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, firstly the hypotheses are stated and the pre-models of 
previous chapter are outlined in Section 3.1. Next, the data, the variables used in 
the estimation of the models are described in detail in Section 3.2. Subsequently, 
the econometric methodology is presented in Section 3.3.
3.1. Hypotheses
In order to explain FDI, parallel to the hypotheses in the FDI literature, this 
study incorporates many variables. The preceding chapter indicate that actual and 
potential size of the market, openness to trade, interest rates and exchange rates 
are commonly utilized determinants of FDI. In addition, the model is appended 
with aid and lagged FDI.
As a matter of fact, aid is never used in an aggregate study to control the 
effect on FDI flows. Root and Ahmed (1978) mention aid as determinant of FDI 
but does not report a significant relationship. Blaise (2005) gives an account to the 
positive and significant causality, yet this result cannot be generalized due to 
microeconomic orientation of this study. For this reason, by taking into account 
the unconditional promoting effect of aid on domestic investment and growth in
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the studies such as Hansen and Tarp (2001), this study asserts a positive causality 
from aid to FDI.
Lagged values of FDI appear in models to capture the influence of past FDI 
inflows on current FDI. Both Singh and Jun (1995) and Deichmann et al. (2003) 
propose lagged values of FDI and find positive and significant relationship 
between past and current values of FDI. This study also hypothesizes positive 
causality from previous to present FDI inflows, that is, high FDI in the past 
foretells higher FDI inflows at the present time.
GDP growth is included which measures potential market size. Analogous to 
the finding of Nigh (1986) and Albuquerque et al. (2003), higher GDP growth 
rates indicating larger market size is expected to be more attractive for FDI 
inflows.
GDP per capita is added to capture both actual market size and economic 
development. Fall et al. (2003), Singh and Jun (1995) or Deichman et al. (2003) 
report the coefficient of GDP per capita is positive, since relatively big actual 
markets with developed economies are hypothesized to be favored by FDI. So, 
higher values of GDP per capita are expected to correspond to higher FDI.
Human capital is another development indicator which is examined in the 
model. However, since GDP per capita and human capital are found to be highly 
correlated^ these variables do not appear in the same models, and are used as 
substitutes. Importance of education is mentioned in Lall et al. (2003) and 
Deichman et al. (2003). These studies find positive relationship between
See Appendix C.
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educational development and FDI inflows. Correspondingly, human capital 
variable in this study is also expected to effect FDI positively.
Openness to trade is controlled which indicates the development in trade 
policies. Deichman (2001), Janicki and Wunnava (2004), Galego et al. (2004) and 
Smarzynska and Wei (2001) all state the complementary relationship between 
openness to trade and FDI inflows. Parallel to this idea, the expectation on this 
variable is that, the more the country is open to trade, the more she will receive 
FDI. As a proxy of trade policy development, share of total exports and imports in 
GDP is utilized.
REER is inserted to catch the appreciation and depreciation of the domestic 
currency and its effects on FDI. The link from exchange rates to FDI is found to 
be negative in Aliber (1970), Lall et al. (2003), Love and Lage-Hidago (2000), 
and Singh and Jun (1995). Similarly, REER and FDI relationship is expected to be 
negative, that is FDI is distracted by an increase in REER, or an appreciation of 
domestic currency, and FDI is attracted by a decrease in REER, that is a 
depreciation of domestic currency.
Inflation is put in the model as an instability indicator. Since FDI seek stable 
economies, inflation is expected to be a negative determinant of FDI which mean 
that as inflation in a country increases FDI inflow will decrease. Variation in the 
inflation is also integrated to the model as another instability indicator. Similarly, 
the relationship between variation in the inflation and FDI is expected to be 
negative.
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In order to test these specifications, the basic model is constructed:
(3.1.1) FDIi = f  (Aid; la g g e d FDI; o th er co n tro l v a r ia b le s)
Subsequently, in view of the aid literature on conditional effects of aid on 
economic growth and domestic investment, this study incorporates interaction 
terms into the basic model constructed in the previous section. In the first 
augmented model, the interaction term of aid with quality of governance variables 
are included. Similar to the hypothesis in Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) where 
positive effect of aid on growth is subject to the development in policy, aid 
interacted with sound governance is expected to be positively effectual on FDI 
whereas the single term aid need not be positive. Additionally, the interaction 
term of lagged values of FDI with quality of governance are integrated to the 
model. Just like the hypothesis on interaction term of aid, while lagged FDI is not 
necessarily expected to boost current FDI, interacted FDI terms are expected to 
promote current FDI inflows. To summarize, in the absence of sound political 
environment, aid and lagged FDI are expected to effect the current FDI negatively. 
However, if the governance is well developed, aid and lagged FDI are expected to 
increase FDI inflows. The hypotheses on all other variables are like in the basic 
model.
In the second augmented model, as controlled in Nkusu and Sayek (2004), 
and Albuquerque et al. (2003), the conditional influence of financial market 
development indicators on effect of aid and lagged FDI is checked. Rather than 
inserting interaction terms of aid and lagged FDI with quality of governance.
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interaction terms of aid and lagged FDI with financial market development 
indicators are integrated to the basic model. Expectations are parallel to the 
literature, specifically, if the financial market is well developed with sound depth, 
the effects of aid and lagged FDI on current FDI flows are expected to be positive, 
whereas undeveloped financial markets are expected to hinder the positive effects 
of aid or lagged FDI. Again, the expectations on all other variables, which also 
appear in the basic model, does not divert. Based on these expectations, extended 
models are formed:
(3.1.2) F D It = /  (Aid; A id  x  G overn an ce; la g g e d  FD I;
la g g e d  F D I x  G overn an ce; o th er co n tro l va r ia b les)
(3.1.3) FD Ii =  f  (Aid; A id  x  F in a n cia l M a rk e t D eve lo p m en t; la g g e d  FD I;
la g g e d  F D I X F in an cia l M a rk e t D eve lo p m en t; o th er co n tro l 
variab les)
In (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) the effect of governance and the effect of financial 
market development on FDI is analyzed separately. Alternatively, in the last 
augmented model all interaction terms, that is, the terms with quality of 
governance and the terms with quality of financial markets are employed 
altogether. Yet, expectations on these terms are not changed. To be precise, in this 
model, aid and lagged FDI are hypothesized to be supporting current flows of FDI 
under reliable conditions of governance and financial market; and the effect of aid 
and lagged FDI is expected to be obstructing if the governance and financial
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markets are undeveloped or functioning inaccurately. Expectations on all other 
variables do not alter. (3.1.4) models the effects of both governance and financial 
market development on FDI jointly.
(3.1.4) F D I I = /  (A id; A id  x  G overn an ce; A id  x  F in a n cia l M arket
D eve lopm en t; la g g e d  FD I; la g g e d  F D I  x  G overn an ce;
la g g e d  F D I X F in an cia l M a rk e t D eve lo p m en t; o th er co n tro l 
variab les)
Table 3.1 summarizes variables utilized in the simple and three augmented 
model, and the hypotheses on their effects on FDI.
Table 3.1: Variables in models and their expected effects on FDI
Name of the variable (3.1.1) (3.1.2) (3.1.3) (3.1.4)
Aid (+) (?) (?) (?)
Aid with sound governance (+) (+)
Aid with sound financial markets (+) (+)
Lagged FDI (+) (?) (?) (?)
Lagged FDI with sound governance (+) (+)
Lagged FDI with sound financial markets (+) (+)
GDP growth (+) (+) (+) (+)
GDP per capita or 
Human capital (+) (+) (+) (+)
Openness to trade (+) (+) (+) (+)
PEER ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
Inflation ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
Inflation volatility ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
Many other determining variables of FDI mentioned in the literature, such as 
interest rates, cost differentials, physical and psychic distance, and market power
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are excluded in this study. This omission of variables is due to several reasons: 
First reason is the high correlation between added variables and omitted ones; for 
instance, interest rates are highly correlated with the inflation, and hence omitted 
from the model. Second reason is the unavailable or unsatisfactory data of some 
variables; e.g. data on cost differentials is not satisjfying, and REER captures the 
effect of cost differentials up to a degree. Third reason is the aggregate objective 
of the study; the variables such as physical distance can be used efficiently in 
bilateral studies, yet comprehensive structure of this study does not allow the 
usage of such fixed measures. Fourth reason of non-inclusion is for the sake of 
simplicity; for example, supply side factors such as market power or existence of 
product cycle is out of scope of this study.
3.2. Data and the variables
This study uses a panel data set composed of 97 countries and over the 
period of 1960-2004, where available. Since there are some missing observations 
for some variables in different time periods for different countries, the data is 
unbalanced. The data is obtained from four different sources: Data of aid, FDI, 
growth of GDP, GDP per capita, openness, REER and inflation are obtained from 
World Development Indicators Online. GDP and claims of deposit money banks 
is acquired from IMF IFS CD-ROM version 1.1.54. Governance indices are 
obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2003). Human capital data is taken from the study 
of Barro and Lee (2000). Appendix A provides an explanation of the data, sources 
of data and the derivations of all variables.
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The main variables employed in the basic model consist of FDI and aid. 
Share of FDI in GDP (sFDI) is used as the endogenous variable. Share of official 
development assistance (ODA) in GDP (sODA) is taken as the aid measure. 
However, since the right hand side effects on FDI takes some time to realize, and 
also to smooth cyclical variations and exogenous shocks, moving average of the 
variables over n years (MA«) are taken. For this reason, MArz of sODA 
(MAnsODA) is used in the models. The coefficient of MA«sODA is expected to 
be positive, which reflects the main hypothesis. Moreover, in order to control the 
effects of past sFDI on current sFDI, the first lag of MA« of sFDI (MAnsFDI(-l)) 
is inserted as an explanatory variable. MA«sFDI(-l) is expected to effect sFDI 
positively, representing the hypothesis that past flows of FDI will result in higher 
rates of FDI.
In order to estimate these relationships, development indices, inflation, real 
effective exchange rate, openness and growth of GDP are also controlled for. First 
of all, the effect of development level on sFDI is controlled with the MA« of 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita in current US dollars (MAwlnGDPpc). It is 
possible that the countries with higher MA«lnGDPpc will receive more sFDI, thus 
the coefficient of MA«lnGDPpc is expected to be positive. In alternative models, 
since average years of secondary schooling as a measure of human capital (HK) 
may have similar effects on sFDI as that of MAnlnGDPpc, MAn of HK (MAnHK) 
is employed in place of MA«lnGDPpc. The effect of MA«HK is likely to be 
positive because this variable also measures the degree of development. 
Additionally, interaction term of MA«lnGDPpc with regional dummy of Africa
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Secondly, the effect of inflation on sFDI is measured with the MAn of the 
rate of depreciation in money stock (MA«D) where the rate of depreciation in 
money stock (D) is as in Cukierman et al. (1992)'*. The effect of MA«D on sFDI is 
expected to be negative, indicating that higher rates of past inflation will depress 
current flows of FDI. Moreover, the standard deviation of D over k  years (akD) is 
used as instability indicator. The effect of fluctuations on sFDI is expected to be 
negative.
Thirdly, MA« of natural logarithm of real effective exchange rate index for 
1995=100 (MAwlnREER) is added to the models to control for the effect of 
exchange rate on sFDI. It is expected that the effect of MA«lnREER on sFDI will 
be negative, showing that depreciation of host country’s currency will attract more 
FDI flows.
Fourthly, openness of a country to trade is another variable that influence 
FDI flows. Openness to trade can be measured with the ratio of exports (X) and 
imports (M) of goods and services to GDP. Hence, MA« of the sum of share of X 
and M in GDP in current local currency (MAnopen) is inserted to the models as a 
control variable. The coefficient of MAnopen is expected to be positive, 
supporting the belief that openness to trade will improve FDI inflows.
Finally, growth of GDP is possible to have effects on sFDI, therefore MA« 
of growth in GDP (MAngrGDP) is added to models. In view of the opinion that 
GDP growth will draw FDI, MA«grGDP is expected to change sFDI positively.
(MAwlnGDPpc X Afr) is added in models to control for possible different
response of FDI to the level of development in African countries.
* D  = ;r/(l + 7c) where k  denotes inflation rate. Appendix A presents derivation of D.
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In addition to all these control variables, there are interaction terms of 
MA«sFDI and MA«sODA with quality of governance (Gov) and financial market 
development (FMD) indicators. Firstly, there are six Gov indicators which are 
constructed with an unobserved components methodology by Kaufmann et al. 
(2003)^ and cover 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. 
These indices combine numerous measures of governance and the original 
governance scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5 where higher scores in each index 
mean better governance. However, since these indices are used in the interaction 
terms, this study takes the average values of the four time periods and normalize 
these values to an interval between 0 and 1. The normalized governance indicators 
are Political Stability and Absence of Violence (Pols), Rule of Law (Rule), 
Control of Corruption (Contcorr), Government Effectiveness (Goveff), 
Regulatory Quality (Requal), and Voice and Accountability (Voacc). Pols index 
determines perceptions of the possibility of an overthrow or destabilization of the 
government in act with illegal and violent method. Rule index indicates the extent 
of confidence in and recognition of the rules of the society by the citizens. 
Contcorr index determines perceptions of corruption, which is public power used 
for individual benefits. Goveff index measures the quality of bureaucracy and 
public service provision, the capability of civil servants, the independence of civil 
service from political pressure, and the reliability of the commitment of 
government. Requal index determines the rate of existence of market-unfriendly 
policies, and Voacc index measures the political rights and freedom of individuals. 
This study employs product of MAnsODA with Gov indicators *
* Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, The World Bank.
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(MA«sODA X Gov), and the first lag of the product of MAwsFDI with Gov 
indicators (MAwsFDI x G ov(-l)). The coefficients of both variables are expected 
to be positive reflecting that good governance in a country improves the effects 
from aid and FDI.
Secondly, this study uses three financial market development (FMD) 
indicators. These indicators shows to what extend the financial market is 
developed, and higher values mean better financial market conditions. As done for 
Gov indicators, FMD indicators are normalized between 0 and 1. These indicators 
are share of money and quasi money in GDP (sM2); share of total claims of 
deposit money banks in GDP (sCR); and share of claims of deposit money banks 
on private sector in GDP (sCRpr). FMD interaction terms appearing in the models 
are the product of MA/isODA with FMD indicators (MAwsODA x FMD) and the 
first lag of the product of MAnsFDI with FMD indicators (MAttsFDI x FM D(-l)). 
As countries with well developed financial markets are expected to have positive 
returns from aid and FDI, both interaction terms are expected to affect sFDI 
positively.
3.3. Methodology
This section explains the methodology applied to the panel data set 
introduced in the previous sections. Since panel data sets covers both time-series 
and cross-sectional data, the increase in available data, and consequent increase in 
degrees of freedom make these sets very useful in the econometric analyses. 
Moreover, studies using panel data sets can address complex models involving
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important economic problems which can be analyzed neither by time-series data, 
nor by cross-sectional data.
The general static single-equation panel model is:
=x; , / J  +  T, + i , + s „ ,
t  =  0 , . . . , T - l ,
where x„ is a vector of K explanatory variables, r, is time specific effect, i,. 
is individual specific effect, is the error term, T  is time range and N  is 
number of individuals.
When explanatory variables include some of the lagged values of dependent 
variables, the model becomes dynamic and such a model can be written as:
j=l
r = 0 , . . . ,r , - l ,
i = 0 , . . . ,w - l ,
where lagged values of dependent variables are available, is a vector of 
K explanatory variables, z, is individual specific effect, £·„ is the error term, 7] is
number of time periods for zth individual for an unbalanced panel data set, and N  
is number of individuals.
Nickell (1981) shows that the dynamic character of the model and existence 
of individual specific fixed effects cause problems and inconsistent estimates in 
OLS estimation of the models and the asymptotic biases are presented to be large 
and matching with the estimates in Nervole (1967) and Maddala (1971). Since the
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models in this study have explanatory variables including some lagged values of 
the dependent variable and the panel data set is unbalanced; dynamic panel data 
estimation method developed by Arellano and Bond (1988) is found to be the 
proper technique to estimate the model. The computer software Ox version 3.10 is 
used in model estimations and "Panel Data estimation, using DPD for Ox" by 
Doomik, Arellano and Bond (2002) is used to apply the imbalanced panel data set 
in an appropriate way and utilize the generalized methods of moments (GMM).
In this method, in order to remove country specific fixed effect biases, the 
estimations take the first differences of all variables in the equation. This 
transformation leads to a decrease in the number of observations by the number of 
cross-section observations, N,  and thus to a loss in degrees of freedom in 
estimation. Although, the basic model assumed to have white-noise errors; the 
transformation causes first order serial correlation in the error terms. Hence, 
instrumental variables technique is employed to prevent this serial correlation. 
The first and second moments of the rest of the lags of the dependent variable that 
is not used in the explanatory part of the model, is built with GMM technique in 
Arellano and Bond (1988) and applied as the GMM instrument. The set of 
instrument variables is composed of all explanatory variables except 
MA«sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the (n + 1)^ and all 
subsequent lags of MAnsFDI. The specifications and lag lengths are tested with 
Sargan test and serial correlation test.
The Sargan test is used to test the validity of instrument variables. The 
hypothesis being tested with the Sargan test is that the instrumental variables are
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A R (m )  tests are used to test the existence of m order serial correlation 
respectively. The hypothesis being tested with AR tests is that there does not exist 
m  order serial correlation. If the null hypothesis is rejected by the statistic, there 
exists m  order serial correlation. For the purposes of the analysis, since dynamic 
panel data involves an AR(1) process for the error terms, the lack of second order 
autocorrelation is the main concern, which thus requires the non-rejection of Hq = 
no AR(2) or Ho == no m2  as denoted in Arellano and Bond (1991).
Moreover, Wald tests are used to test the significance of groups of variables. 
Wald (Joint) test in the tables are on all explanatory variables except dummies. 
The null hypothesis being tested with Wald (Joint) test is that none of the 
coefficients, excluding the constant, in the model is statistically significant. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected by the statistic, then at least one of the coefficients is 
statistically significant. Wald (Dummy), Wald (sODA terms), Wald (sFDI terms) 
and Wald (InGDPpc terms) tests are similar tests to check the significance of 
dummies including constant term; significance of all terms with sODA; 
significance of all terms with sFDI; and significance of all terms with InGDPpc, 
respectively.
uncorrelated with a set of residuals, and hence instruments are suitable. If the null
hypothesis is not rejected by the statistic, the instruments are valid.
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CHAPTER 4
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In view of the foregoing explanation on the data, the variables and the 
econometric methodology, in this chapter, firstly the model specifications are 
introduced in section 4.1. Then, regression results are discussed in section 4.2.
4.1. Models
Based on the test results, specifications taking и = 3 and k =  5, that is, using 
МАЗ of the explanatory variables, and a5D with the particular instrument 
variables, are found to be appropriate. Specifically, Sargan test results reported 
that instrument variables are found to be uncorrelated with the error terms and m2  
tests presented that there is no second order serial correlation.
When the variables are integrated into the basic model of this study, the 
model (3.1.1) can be rewritten as:
(4.1.1)
sFDIn = огд,. + «j (МАЗ sODA)n + «2 (MA3 sFDI)n^ ,_^ ^
+ «3 (МАЗ In GDPpc)i, + (MA3 D ) +qTj (cr5 Z))„ 
+ oTg (MA3 In REER)i, + or, (МАЗ ореп)ц 
+ a , ( M A 3 g r G D P l
The main hypothesis here is that MA3sODA affects sFDI positively. Other 
expectations are that MA31nGDPpc, МАЗореп, MA3grGDP, and MA3sFDI(-l) 
affects current sFDI positively while MA3D, ct5D, and MA31nREER affect sFDI
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negatively.^ For all following regressions, dynamic panel data estimation method, 
described in Section 3.3, was used; and estimation is carried out with Ox version 
3.10. The instrument set includes all right hand side variables except MA3sFDI 
and GMM-type instrument is fourth and further lags of MA3sFDI.
The regression results of (4.1.1) are presented in the first column of Table
4.1.1. Test results of first column of Table 4.1.1 present joint significance with 
well defined instruments and no second order autocorrelation. However, although 
MA3sFDI(-l), MA3D, MA31nREER, MA3open and MA3grGDP have 
coefficients corresponding to the expectations, the results show that MA3sODA 
and a5D is statistically significant at %1 level with unexpected signs. Also, 
interestingly it is found that coefficient of MA31nGDPpc is statistically significant 
at 1% level with a minus sign.
Alternatively MA3HK is used in place of MA31nGDPpc since both of the 
variables measure the similar effect on sFDI. Results are shown in the second 
column of Table 4.1.1. The results presents that the signs of coefficients of all 
variables except MA3sODA are matching with the expectations stated above. 
Null hypothesis of Wald tests are rejected which means that at least one of the 
coefficients is statistically significant. Sargan test result shows that instruments 
are appropriate and m2 test result indicates that there is no second order 
autocorrelation.
Based on the investigation of the residual terms of the regression results in 
first column of Table 4.1.1, it is observed that the residuals of African countries 
stand out as largely negative. Therefore, the effect of MA31nGDPpc on sFDI in
 ^ Squared aid term is controlled for returns of scale. The term is not found to be significant 
indicating constant returns to scale.
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Africa is separately inspected. A possible different behavior of Africa is 
controlled with the inclusion of the interactive term of MA31nGDPpc x Afr. The 
results are reported in the third column of Table 4.1.1.
Table 4.1.1: Regression results of the basic model (4.1.1)
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: I II III
(MA3SODA) -0.05***(-17.70)
-0.05***
(-10.30)
-0.06***
(-16.40)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) 0.18***(142.00)
0.39***
(66.30)
0.16***
(85.50)
(MA3lnGDPpc) -0.002***(-6.77)
0.01***
(17.60)
(MA3HK) 0.01***(13.60)
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr) -0.02***(-38.40)
(MA3D) -0.02***(-18.80)
-0.02***
(-17.60)
-0.02***
(-15.00)
(ct5D) 0.01***(4.29)
-0.02***
(-10.50)
0.0003
(-0.18)
(MA3lnREER) -0.002***(-13.50)
-0.01***
(-19.60)
-0.003***
(-10.90)
(MA3open) 0.02***(42.30)
0.02***
(34.20)
0.02***
(28.10)
(MA3grGDP) 0.08***(31.50)
0.06***
(8.25)
0.08***
(64.50)
Constant 0.001***(68.40)
0.0001***
(2.34)
0.001***
(44.70)
No. of Observations 1320 1013 1320
Wald (Joint) 66930[0.00]
64620
[0.00]
63560
[0.00]
Wald (Dummy) 4683[0.00]
5.47
[0.02]
2001
[0.00]
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 1630[0.00]
Sargan test 85.09[1.00]
64.98
[1.00]
89.06
[1.00]
m2 test -0.88[0.38]
0.21
[0.83]
-0.88
[0.38]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except 
MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the (/? + 1)  ^ and all subsequent lags of 
MA3sFDL
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Third column of Table 4.1.1 presents that negative coefficient of 
MA31nGDPpc in the second column was due to African countries, since 
MA31nGDPpc X Afr is negatively significant at %1, where MA31nGDPpc is 
positively significant at %1. Strangely, in all three columns, the outcomes of 
MA3sODA are negative and significant. These negative results are possibly on 
account of low governance statistics in countries receiving aid. Hence, in order to 
control the governance effect on FDI flows, interaction terms of 
MA3sODA X Gov and MA3sFDI x G ov(-l) are introduced in (4.1.2):
sFDIi, = « 0, + aj (MA3 sODA)^, + oTj (MA3 sO D A  x Gov),.,
+ QTj (MA3 + » 4  (MA3 sF D I  x Gov),(,_i)
(4.1.2) + ¿^ 5 (MA3 In GDPpc)^, + or^  (MA3 In G D P p c  x Afr),^
+ a , (MA3 D )  „ + «8 (o- 5 D \  + « 9  (MA3 In PE ER),,
+ or,Q (MA3open)n + or,, (MA3grG D P )^
For this model, the main hypothesis is that while the interaction term
MA3sODA X Gov affects sFDI positively; the coefficient of MA3sODA needs
not to be positive, which means that MA3sODA is effective on sFDI in a positive
manner only if the country has stable governance. Also, for similar reasons, it is
expected that the interaction term MA3sFDI x G ov(-l) has positive effects on
sFDI where MA3sFDI(-l) need not be significantly positive. Coefficients of
control variables are expected to be parallel to previous expectations. The
regression results are presented in Table 4.1.2.
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Table 4.1.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.2) with MA3InGDPpc
Introducing the interaction terms of MASsODA and MASsFDI with Gov
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory
Variables: Gov = Pols Rule Contcorr Requal Goveff Voacc
(MA3SODA)
(MASsODA X Gov)
(MA3sFDI)(-1)
(MA3sFDIxGov)(-1)
(MASInGDPpc)
(MASInGDPpc X Afr)
(MA3D)
(aSD)
(MASInREER)
(МАЗореп)
(MASgrGDP)
Constant
-0.22***
(-13.70)
0.28***
(10.20)
-0.90***
(-108.00)
( 122.00)
-0.003""*
(-3.04)
-0.02"""
(-16.70)
-0.04"""
(-27.20)
-0.02"""
( -10.20)
-0.003"""
(-9.29)
0.03"""
(47.30)
0.03"""
( 11.20)
0.001"""
(32.10)
No. of observation 
Wald (joint)
Wald (dummy)
Wald (MASsODA terms)
Wald (MASsFDI terms)
Wald (MASInGDPpc 
terms)
Sargan test 
m2 test
1270
76700
[0 .00]
1031
[0 .00]
247.40
[0 .00]
14900
[0.00]
1024
[0 .00]
82.24
[1.00]
-0.04
[0.97]
-0.26"*"
(-12.50)
0.63""*
(13.70)
-0.90"""
( -102.00)
2.22***
(118.00)
0.003""*
(4.61)
-0.02"""
(-24.00)
-0.02"""
(-21.30)
-0.01"""
(-4.99)
-0.003"""
(-9.13)
0.02"""
(31.90)
0.05"""
(19.00)
0.001"""
(42.30)
1320
97170
[0 .00]
1793
[0.00]
198.30
[0 .00]
21780
[0.00]
1380
[0 .00]
86.34
[1.00]
-1.03
[0.30]
-0.27"*"
(-20.40)
0.80"""
(24.40)
-0.68"*"
(-64.90)
2.01**"
(72.90)
0.004*""
(6.93)
-0.02"*"
(-29.50)
-0.02"*"
(-24.70)
-0.01*""
(-4.50)
-0.003*""
(-9.07)
0.02"*"
(33.40)
0.05""*
(22.50)
0.001"""
(41.20)
1320
31370
[0 .00]
1694
[0.00]
618.70
[0.00]
10700
[0 .00]
2961
[0 .00]
86.63
[1.00]
-0.99
[0.32]
-0.44*""
(-20.90)
0.76"*"
(19.00)
-1.64""*
(-132.00)
2.78"""
(150.00)
0.003""*
(5.86)
-0.02"""
(-24.00)
-0.02"**
(-14.60)
-0.003*"
(-1.98)
-0.003"*"
(-9.32)
0.02"""
(34.40)
0.05"""
(19.60)
0.001"""
(43.40)
1320
154000
[0 .00]
1884
[0 .00]
576.40
[0.00]
35510
[0 .00]
610.10
[0 .00]
85.65
[1.00]
-1.09
[0.28]
-0.31*""
(-22.40)
0.72"""
(16.90)
-1.10**"
(-105.00)
2.66"""
(114.00)
0.003**"
(5.45)
-0.02***
(-23.10)
-0.02"""
(-22.40)
-0.01"""
(-3.39)
-0.003"""
(-10.40)
0.02"""
(29.10)
0.05"""
(22.70)
0.001"""
(51.00)
1320
63340
[0 .00]
2600
[0 .00]
1380
[0.00]
19920
[0.00]
843.30
[0 .00]
85.29
[1.00]
-0.97
[0.33]
-0.22"**
(-15.50)
0.37*"*
(17.10)
-0.71"*"
(-64.80)
1.23"*"
(73.00)
0.004"*"
(7.61)
-0.02*"*
(-27.70)
-0.02"""
( -22 .20)
- 0 . 002"
(-1.65)
- 0 . 002" " "
(-7.64)
0.03"**
(39.60)
0.06"""
(20.60)
0.001"""
(34.70)
1320
23960
[0.00]
1205
[0.00]
337.20
[0.00]
7993
[0 .00]
1185
[0.00]
87.43
[1.00]
-1.18
[0.24]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level and * indicates significance at 10% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the {n + 1)^  ^and all subsequent lags of MASsFDI.
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It can be seen in Table 4.1.2 that the results are consistent with the 
expectations that better Gov is needed for MASsODA and MA3sFDI(-l) to affect 
sFDI positively. Other coefficients and test outcomes generally conform with the 
expectations as well. Moreover, instead of MA31nGDPpc and 
MA31nGDPpc X Aff, MA3HK is inserted to (4.1.2). The findings are in 
Appendix D and similar to the results in Table 4.1.2.
Subsequently, rather than putting interaction terms with Gov, interaction 
terms of MA3sODA X FMD and MA3sFDI x FM D (-l) are added into (4.1.1) 
with the intention of controlling the FMD effects on outcomes.
sFDI^j = « 0, + or, (MA3 sODA)^^ + (MA3 sO D A  x FMD)^,
+ « 3  (MA3 sFD I\,_^^  + « 4  (MA3 sF D I  x FMD),^,_^^
(4.1.3) + « 3  (MA3 In G D P p c ), + (MA3 In G D P p c  x A fr ) ,
+  Щ (MA3 D )  „+ ag (cr5 £»)„ + a ,  (MA3 In P E E R ),
+ o:,o (M A3 ope«),., +cr,, (MA3 grG D P )i,
The main hypothesis of this model is that MA3sODA x FMD has positive 
effect on sFDI, but MA3sODA is not necessarily expected to have a positive 
effect on sFDI. Hence it is expected that MA3sODA is positively effectual on 
sFDI only in case where financial market is well developed. Likewise, 
MA3sFDI X FMD(-1) is expected to change sFDI positively, while MA3sFDI(-l) 
is not essentially expected to have positive effects on sFDI. Table 4.1.3 present 
the outcomes of the regression of (4.1.3).
Table 4.1.3 reports that the results are consistent with the expectations that 
better FMD is needed for MA3sODA and MA3sFDI(-l) to affect sFDI positively. 
Other coefficients and test results mainly correspond to the expectations. Also, the 
results from regression where MA3HK is used in (4.1.3) instead of MA31nGDPpc
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and MA31nGDPpc x Afr are in Appendix D and similar to the results in 
Table 4.1.3.
Table 4.1.3: Regression results of the model (4.1.3) with MA31nGDPpc 
Introducing the interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI with FMD
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR
(MA3SODA)
(MASsODA X FMD)
(MA3sFDI)(-1)
(MA3sFDIxFMD)(-1)
(MA3lnGDPpc)
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr)
(MA3D)
(q5D)
(MA3InREER)
(MA3open)
(MA3grGDP)
Constant
No. of Observations 
Wald (Joint)
Wald (Dummy)
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 
Wald (MA3sFDI terms) 
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
-0.08"**
(-17.70)
0.17***
(16.00)
-0.26***
(-28.50)
1.67***
(44.20)
0.003***
(5.03)
-0.02***
(-23.90)
-0.02***
(-16.80)
- 0.001
(-0.70)
-0.003***
(-11.50)
0.02***
(26.30)
0.08***
(39.10)
0.001***
(28.40)
1316
129100
[0 .00]
805.30 
[0 .00]
355
[0 .00]
10060
[0 .00]
652.30 
[0 .00] 
84.55
[1.00] 
-0.90 
[0.37]
1308
119700
[0 .00]
892.90
[0 .00]
474.50
[0 .00]
4733
[0 .00]
759.80 
[0.00]
80.80
[1.00] 
-0.85 
[0.39]
sCRpr
-0.11***
(-15.60)
0.71***
(21.80)
-0.09***
(-17.80)
0.93***
(34.60)
0.005***
(5.69)
-0.03***
(-27.50)
-0.01***
(-9.45)
0.001
(0.38)
-0.003***
(-13.20)
0.02***
(26.00)
0.09***
(41.80)
0.001***
(29.90)
-0.12***
(-21.60)
0.72***
(30.10)
-0.14***
(-19.00)
1.09***
(34.90)
0.003***
(3.09)
-0.02***
(-22.30)
-0.01***
(-9.55)
0.001
(0.17)
-0.004***
(-8.44)
0.01***
(18.80)
0.09***
(52.20)
0.001***
(30.60)
1303
123000
[0.00]
934.20
[0 .00]
906.30
[0.00]
4292
[0 .00]
502.50
[0.00]
84.09
[1.00]
-0.89
[0.38]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, * indicates significance at 10% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the ( n +  1)“ and all subsequent lags of MA3sFDI.
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sFDI¡, = огд, + ОГ; (МАЗ sODA)^, + oTj (МАЗ sO D A  x Gov)^
+ « 3  (MA3 sO D A  X F M D ),, +  a ,  (MA3 sFDI),^,.,^
 ^ + « 5  (MA3 sF D I X Gov),(,_,j + (MA3 sF D I x FMD),^,_^^
+ cr, (MA3 In G D P pc),, + (MA3 In G D P p c  x A fr)„
+ «5 (MA3D)„+a,o {<y5D)„ +агц (МА31п^г^^£Л),.,
+ a , 2 (МАЗ open),, + а,з (МАЗ g rG D P ),,
Here, the main hypothesis is that MA3sODA x Gov and MA3sODA x FMD 
has positive effect on sFDI. MA3sODA is not necessarily expected to have a 
positive coefficient. This hypothesis states that sound governance companied with 
a well developed financial market is essential for an assisted country to have 
positive changes in its foreign investment inflows. MA3sFDI x G ov(-l) and 
MA3sFDI X FM D(-l) are also expected to affect sFDI positively, as 
MA3sFDI(-l) need not be positive. Control variables are expected to behave as 
reported before. The results of the regression of (4.1.4) for each of the six Gov 
indicators are shown in Tables 4.1.4.1 to 4.1.4.6.
Although there exists high correlation among the interaction variables in 
these models, the majority of the results in Tables 4.1.4.1 to 4.1.4.6 reports that 
better Gov and FMD are both needed for MA3sODA and MA3sFDI(-l) to affect 
sFDI positively. Coefficients of other variables and test results are also parallel to 
the expectations.
When human capital is used instead of InGDPpc and the interaction term of 
InGDPpc with Afr, the findings are similar to the results reported in Tables 4.1.4.1
Finally, each of the six Gov interaction terms are used together with the
FMD interaction terms of (4.1.3):
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Table 4.1.4.1: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3InGDPpc 
Introducing Pols and FMD interaction terms of MASsODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
to 4.1.4.6. Hence, these results are not reported for simplicity but can be found in
Appendix D.
Explanatory variables: FMD =
(MA3SODA)
(MA3SODA X Pols) 
(MA3SODA X FMD) 
(MA3sFDI)(-1)
(MA3SFDI X Pols)(-1) 
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) 
(MA3lnGDPpc) 
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr) 
(MA3D)
(ct5D)
(MA3lnREER)
(MA3open)
(MA3grGDP)
Constant 
No. of Observations 
Wald (Joint)
Wald (Dummy)
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
M2 sCR sCRpr
-0.20**’" -0.23*** -0.21***
(-11.60) (-13.10) (-11.10)
0.23*** 0.32*** 0.21***
(6.62) (10.70) (8.02)
-0.01 -0.21*** 0.27***
(-0.47) (-7.05) (10.30)
-0.96*** -0.91*** -0.88***
(-71.00) (-83.60) (-78.00)
1.99*** 1.58*** 44***
(56.70) (58.60) (50.20)
-1.22*** 0.10 0.41***
(-8.81) (1.08) (4.45)
-0.002* -0.003*** -0.003***
(-1.73) (-3.31) (-3.04)
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02***
(-12.50) (-12.80) (-14.30)
-0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03***
(-19.60) (-25.10) (-24.00)
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01***
(-8.19) (-9.95) (-6.76)
-0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(-6.86) (-3.95) (-7.42)
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(28.20) (31.10) (20.40)
0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(5.86) (11.70) (12.60)
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(22.70) (26.30) (24.20)
1266 1258 1253
392400 61970 27680
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
514.80 694.10 585.50
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
327.40 317.50 183.90
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
23070 10740 7806
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
914.60 599.80 534.10
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
79.13 80.96 80.05
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
-0.11 0.00 -0.04
[0.92] [1.00] [0.97]
Note; Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the (n->- 1)'*' and all subsequent lags of MASsFDI.
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Table 4.1.4.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MASlnGDPpc
Introducing Rule and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and MASsFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0.26***(-10.20)
-0.25***
(-12.00)
-0.24***
(-8.01)
(MA3SODA X Rule) 0.59***(8.85)
0.52***
(11.90)
0.47***
(7.60)
(MA3SODA X FMD) 0.04**(2.04)
0.32***
(5.78)
0.47***
(13.50)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -0.91***(-70.60)
-0.87***
(-78.50)
-0.83***
(-53.10)
(MA3SFDI X Rule)(-1) 1.92***(58.70)
2.07***
(82.60)
1.80***
(60.20)
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) 0.74***(14.40)
0.17***
(3.28)
0.58***
(14.40)
(MA3lnGDPpc) 0.001**(2.23)
0.002***
(3.19)
0.001
(1.45)
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr) -0.02***(-16.20)
-0.02***
(-15.80)
-0.02***
(-13.60)
(MA3D) -0.02***(-16.40)
-0.02***
(-12.80)
-0.02***
(-10.80)
(aSD) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***(-6.91) (-4.79) (-3.95)
(MA3lnREER) -0.003***(-7.03)
-0.002***
(-4.56)
-0.003***
(-6.48)
(MA3open) 0.02***(26.10)
0.02***
(22.90)
0.01***
(17.60)
(MA3grGDP) 0.05***(11.80)
0.05***
(16.80)
0.06***
(21.50)
Constant 0.001***(36.40)
0.001***
(32.90)
0.001***
(30.50)
No. of Observations 1316 1308 1303
Wald (Joint) 56960[0.00]
36290
[0.00]
88700
[0.00]
Wald (Dummy) 1324[0.00]
1080
[0.00]
931.40
[0.00]
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 1392[0.00]
209.50
[0.00]
387.40
[0.00]
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 18370[0.00]
9350
[0.00]
5877
[0.00]
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 448.50[0.00]
295.60
[0.00]
241.50
[0.00]
Sargan test 85.91[1.00]
81.47
[1.00]
81.69
[1.00]
m2 test -1.05 -1.01 -1.00[0.29] [0.31] [0.32]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except 
MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the (n + 1)  ^ and all subsequent lags of 
MA3sFDI.
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Introducing Contcorr and FMD interaction terms of MASsODA and
MA3sFDI
Table 4.1.4.3: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MASlnGDPpc
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR
(MA3SODA)
(MASsODA X Contcorr) 
(MA3SODA X FMD) 
(MA3sFDI)(-1)
(MASsFDI X Contcorr)(-1) 
(MASsFDI X FMD)(-1) 
(MASInGDPpc) 
(MASInGDPpc X Afr) 
(MA3D)
(ct5D)
(MASInREER)
(MASopen)
(MASgrGDP)
Constant
No. of Observations 
Wald (Joint)
Wald (Dummy)
Wald (MASsODA terms) 
Wald (MASsFDI terms) 
Wald (MASInGDPpc terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
sCRpr
-0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27***
(-19.10) (-19.70) (-13.60)
0.83*** 0.77*** 0.71***
(17.00) (20.70) (18.00)
-0.01 0.25*** 0.39***
(-0.32) (4.62) (9.75)
-0.70*** -0.67*** -0.64***
(-53.00) (-56.80) (-42.70)
1.56*** 1.72*** 1.46***
(34.60) (51.60) (39.10)
0.95*** 0.54*** 0.86***
(16.30) (13.80) (21.50)
0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001
(4.20) (3.63) (1.25)
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-18.80) (-15.20) (-13.30)
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-21.10) (-14.90) (-12.10)
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(-5.87) (-3.21) (-2.60)
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(-6.31) (-3.92) (-4.06)
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(29.40) (23.10) (16.40)
0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(19.50) (22.00) (21.30)
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(39.10) (34.70) (35.80)
1316 1308 1303
16360 43090 107500
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
1529 1204 1281
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
1618 795.60 692.60
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
9464 5712 5483
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
839.30 287.70 296.30
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
83.63 82.73 82.28
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
-1.01 -0.96 -0.97
[0.31] [0.34] [0.33]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, * indicates significance at 10% 
level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and 
GMM-type instrument includes the { n+  1)  ^and all subsequent lags of MA3sFDI.
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Table 4.1.4.4: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA31nGDPpc
Introducing Requal and FMD interaction terms of MASsODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0.46***(-21.30)
-0.46***
(-27.20)
-0.46***
(-21.90)
(MA3sODA X Requal) 0.75***(17.50)
0.68***
(23.20)
0.65***
(20.30)
(MA3sODA X FMD) 0.03*(1.84)
0.49***
(13.50)
0.58***
(19.80)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -1.63***(-96.90)
-1.61***
(-89.40)
-1.54***
(-72.90)
(MA3sFDIxRequal)(-1) 2.54***(105.00)
2.72***
(85.10)
2.51***
(67.70)
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) 0.75***(19.60)
0.02
(0.61)
0.35***
(10.90)
(MA3lnGDPpc) 0.003***(3.81)
0.003***
(3.74)
0.002***
(2.81)
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr) -0.02***(-21.10)
-0.02***
(-24.70)
-0.02***
(-23.90)
(MA3D) -0.02***(-10.80)
-0.02***
(-10.00)
-0.01***
(-8.51)
(aSD) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***(-5.88) (-3.17) (-2.47)
(MA3lnREER) -0.003***(-7.09)
-0.003***
(-5.93)
-0.003***
(-7.06)
(MA3open) 0.02***(25.90)
0.02***
(26.80)
0.01***
(15.60)
(MA3grGDP) 0.05***(16.90)
0.05***
(25.50)
0.06***
(22.40)
Constant 0.001***(26.90)
0.001***
(33.70)
0.001***
(36.50)
No. of Observations 1316 1308 1303
Wald (Joint) 87250 149500 61220[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Wald (Dummy) 725.70[0.00]
1134
[0.00]
1333
[0.00]
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 2551[0.00]
1195
[0.00]
1043
[0.00]
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 17820[0.00]
8163
[0.00]
5309
[0.00]
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 449.30[0.00]
657.50
[0.00]
638.90
[0.00]
Sargan test 80.24[1.00]
81.89
[1.00]
83.90
[1.00]
m2 test -1.12 -1.09 -1.08[0.26] [0.28] [0.28]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the ( n +  1)  ^and all subsequent lags of MA3sFDI.
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Table 4.1.4.5: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MASlnGDPpc
Introducing Goveff and FMD interaction terms of MASsODA and MASsFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables; FMD: M2 sCR
(MA3SODA)
(MA3sODA X Goveff) 
(MA3SODA X FMD) 
(MA3sFDI)(-1) 
(MA3SFDI X Goveff)(-1) 
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) 
(MASInGDPpc) 
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr) 
(MA3D)
(a5D)
(MA3lnREER)
(MA3open)
(MA3grGDP)
Constant
No. of Observations 
Wald (Joint)
Wald (Dummy)
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 
Wald (MA3sFDI terms) 
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
sCRpr
-0.29*** -0.35*** -0.36***
(-8.55) (-13.20) (-17.40)
0.66*** 0.71*** 0.74***
(6.63) (8.67) (13.40)
0.04* 0.50*** 0.54***
(1.71) (8.95) (14.00)
-1.09*** -1.06*** -1.00***
(-70.10) (-90.20) (-58.40)
2.27*** 2.40*** 2.12***
(57.10) (78.20) (58.80)
0.83*** 0.46*** 0.73***
(17.10) (13.50) (19.70)
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001
(3.18) (2.66) (1.16)
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-19.70) (-20.50) (-15.70)
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-15.30) (-16.20) (-10.90)
-0.01*** -0.004** -0.01**
(-5.35) (-2.06) (-2.24)
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-7.70) (-7.88) (-7.09)
0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(26.20) (22.70) (15.80)
0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(20.20) (22.60) (21.30)
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(28.30) (31.90) (33.10)
1316 1308 1303
31880 42180 26480
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
799.80 1019 1096
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
456.20 412.70 646.70
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
11540 8783 4017
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
463.50 622.20 298.90
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
82.77 84.33 81.38
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
-0.99 -0.96 -0.97
[0.32] [0.34] [0.33]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, * indicates significance at 10% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the (« + !) '’’ and all subsequent lags of MASsFDI.
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Table 4.1.4.6: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MASlnGDPpc
Introducing Voacc and FMD interaction terms of MASsODA and MASsFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR
(MA3SODA)
(MA3sODA X Voacc) 
(MA3SODA X FMD) 
(MA3sFDI)(-1) 
(MA3sFDIxVoacc)(-1) 
(MA3sFDIxFMD)(-1) 
(MA3lnGDPpc) 
(MA3lnGDPpc X Afr) 
(MA3D)
(a5D)
(MA3lnREER)
(MA3open)
(MA3grGDP)
Constant
-0.22***
(-13.50)
0.32***
(9.93)
0.08***
(4.92)
-0.72***
(-58.60)
1.16***
(73.90)
0.34***
(6.99)
0.003***
(4.89)
-0.02***
(-20.70)
-0.02***
(-20.00)
-0.003**
(-2.30)
-0.003***
(-6.67)
0.03***
(31.10)
0.06***
(16.50)
0.001***
(30.20)
No. of Observations 
Wald (Joint)
Wald (Dummy)
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 
Wald (MA3lnGDPpc terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
1316
21610
[0.00]
912.30
[0.00]
795.50
[0.00]
8532
[0.00]
808.10
[0.00]
86.97
[1.00]
-1.19
[0-24]
1316
317800
[0.00]
733
[0.00]
690.60
[0.00]
5828
[0.00]
401.50
[0.00]
82.12
[1.00]
-1.19
[0.23]
sCRpr
-0.21***
(-16.50)
0.25***
(9.08)
0.46***
(8.05)
-0.71***
(-76.00)
1.33***
(53.80)
-0.36***
(-7.42)
0.005***
(6.03)
-0.02***
(-19.80)
-0.02***
(-16.50)
-0.002
(-1.36)
-0.003***
(-6.70)
0.03***
(33.90) 
0.07***
(20.90) 
0.001***
(27.10)
-0.18*** 
(-11.00) 
0.18*** 
(6.81) 
0.55***
(16.10) 
-0.66*** 
(-45.40) 
1.05***
(35.40) 
0.30*** 
(5.78)
0.003***
(4.49)
-0.02***
(-16.10)
-0.02***
(-11.70)
-0.003
(-1.27)
-0.003***
(-7.57)
0.02***
(21.60)
0.07***
(24.40) 
0.001*** 
(25.30)
1316
112600
[0.00]
638.10
[0.00]
460.60
[0.00]
2323
[0.00]
258.70
[0.00]
79.72
[1.00]
■1.13
[0.26]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except 
MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the {n + 1)* and all subsequent lags of 
MA3sFDL
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In all tables, Sargan test results show that null hypothesis is not rejected 
indicating that the instrumental variables are not correlated with the set of 
residuals and are valid to use. m2  test results report that there is no second order 
serial correlation, and Wald test results verify that tested explanatory variables are 
not jointly insignificant.
Table 4.1.1. reports the regression results of (4.1.1) and alternative models 
with MA3HK or with MA31nGDP and MA31nGDPpc x Afr. In all three columns, 
the outcomes of aid are negative and significant which may be due to low 
governance statistics in countries receiving aid. The first column presents the 
results of the regression where MA31nGDPpc is used as the degree of 
development index. The coefficient of lagged FDI is positive and significant at 
1 % level meaning that higher rates FDI received in the previous years will result 
in higher flows of FDI to that country. This consequence supports the rnain 
hypothesis proposed for (4.1.1). The coefficients of inflation and REER are both 
negative and significant confirming the expectations that higher inflation rates and 
real effective exchange rates within a country will scare away foreign investors 
ending with lower FDI ratios. Openness has a significantly positive coefficient 
representing the importance of openness of a country to trade on FDI flows; 
countries that trade goods and services will consequentially receive higher FDI. 
Coefficient of GDP growth also represents a positive significant relationship 
between GDP growth and FDI flows; that is, countries with higher GDP growth 
will attract more FDI.
4.2. R eg ress io n  re su lts
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The coefficient of inflation instability comes out to be positive and 
significant, which is opposite of the expectations where higher fluctuations in 
inflation rates affect FDl flows negatively. Also, coefficient of GDP per capita 
differs from what is expected. Significantly negative coefficient says that 
countries with higher GDP per capita will receive less FDI whereas countries with 
lower GDP per capita will receive more FDI.
In the second column of Table 4.1.1, MA3HK is utilized as proxy for level 
of development and inserted in place of MA31nGDPpc. The second column 
reports that all of the coefficients except aid are parallel to the expectations. 
Coefficient of human capital is positive presenting the importance of development 
levels on FDI inflows. This result indicates that countries with higher HK will 
draw more FDI in future. The coefficients of inflation instability are negative and 
significant implying that lower inflation ratios in a country and stability in the 
economy, respectively, creates a more desirable environment for foreign investors. 
The rest of the results are similar to finding in the first column.
In the third column, MA31nGDPpc x Afr is added in explanatory variables 
set and with this new variable the different behavior of African countries is 
captured. Coefficient of GDP per capita becomes positive and significant, while 
coefficient of the interactive term of GDP per capita with Afr appears with a 
significant negative sign. This can be interpreted as that GDP per capita 
influences FDI positively only if the country is not in Africa, and for African 
countries, higher GDP per person ceases FDI flows.
Interestingly, in Table 1, aid comes out with negative signs that are 
significant, while it is expected to be positive. These negative signs are
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investigated in the subsequent model (4.1.2) whether they are due to low 
governance statistics in some countries getting aid and FDI.
Model (4.1.2) introduces the interaction terms of MA3sODA x Gov and 
MASsFDI X G ov(-l) into (4.1.1). In this model six Gov indicators are used 
separately and the results are reported in Table 4.1.2. In each column the negative 
coefficient of aid does not offset positive coefficient of interactive term of aid 
with Gov. This implies that aid in the previous periods affects sFDI positively 
where governance is sound in a country, while the effect alters to negative where 
there is corruption, political instability, political pressure, restrictions on rights, 
rule of illegality, or other troubles in governance. The main hypothesis for (4.1.2) 
is addressing this very result, which tells that past aid does not necessarily attract 
FDI and a well governance is a must to have aid positively effectual on FDI.
Additionally, in each column interactive term of FDI with governance is 
positive and is not offset by negative coefficient of FDI. This is also analogous to 
the expectations that well governance is necessary for past FDI to positively 
influence current FDI. When there are problems in governance, the effect turns 
out to be negative and FDI begins to fade away.
Rather than using governance interaction terms, model (4.1.3) uses 
interaction terms of MA3sODA x FMD and MA3sFDI x FM D(-l) to examine 
the effect of financial market development on FDI flows. Three FMD indicators 
are utilized separately in (4.1.3) and Table 4.1.3. presents the results in three 
columns. In each column interactive term of aid with FMD has significant 
positive coefficient while aid has significant negative coefficient. However, 
negative aid does not offset interactive term of aid with FMD. This outcome is
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similar to the result in (4.1.2) and clarifies the necessity of a well developed 
financial market in a country for past values of aid to be positively effective on 
FDI. Aid’s effect on FDI need not be positive; or explicitly, aid cannot 
immediately draw FDI. What is needed is a developed financial market for aid to 
influence FDI positively.
Likewise lagged FDI and interactive term of lagged FDI with FMD have 
significant negative and positive signs respectively, indicating that current FDI 
can only be changed positively by past FDI if it is in company with a well 
developed financial market. The remaining of the coefficients corresponds to 
expectations except insignificant coefficients of ct5D.
After using Gov and FMD interaction terms separately in models (4.1.2) and 
(4.1.3) respectively, model (4.1.4) utilizes MASsODA x Gov and 
MA3sFDI X G ov(-l) together with MA3sODA x FMD and 
MA3sFDI X FM D(-l). However existence of high correlation among variables 
distort outcomes. The results are reported in Tables 4.1.4.1 to 4.1.4.6. The 
coefficients of aid are negative but do not counterbalance the coefficients of 
interactive terms of aid with Gov and FMD. This indicates that effect of aid on 
FDI is not always positive. The effect will be positive where governance and 
financial market is well built and progressing, and the effect will turn out to be 
negative where governance and financial market is in poor conditions. Hence, 
status of governance and financial market are two very important factors in 
determining the way of effect of aid on FDI.
Similarly, interactive terms of FDI with Gov and FMD are not offset by 
negative coefficient of FDI implying that the state of governance and financial
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market are the key factors that control the volume and route of FDI flows 
generated from past FDI. The remaining of the variables generally confirms the 
expectations.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
In recent times, FDI is documented to be an important investing tool and 
many studies investigate the effects of FDI on economic gro^vtih. A branch of FDI 
literature also explored the determinants which may encourage or discourage FDI. 
However, there hardly is an agreement on the effects of these indicators and some 
variables such as financial aid are rarely utilized to explain FDI flows. The aid 
literature generally deals with the effect of aid on domestic investment and 
economic growth. The recent studies specifically inspected the influence of aid on 
economic variables under conditions such as characteristics of governance or 
financial markets.
Even though the literature on FDI or aid is broad in scope, there is no 
comprehensive research on aid to FDI causality, which constitutes the main 
motivation of this research. In this study, FDI was not only explained with the 
commonly employed variables, such as market size or exchange rates; but also 
with aid and lagged FDI. While the hypotheses on the control variables other than 
aid were based on the literature, the effect of aid on FDI is the focus of this study. 
The positive stimulus of aid on FDI was hypothesized to be subject to political 
and financial environment; specifically, aid’s effect on FDI was not necessarily 
expected to be prompting, while sensible authority and reliable economic
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institutions were proposed to be compulsory for aid to support FDI. Similarly, 
same conditions were required for lagged FDI to be positively effectual on FDI.
Since lagged values of FDI were utilized as right hand side variables, 
dynamic model estimation techniques were employed. The panel data set cover 
the period of 1960-2004, where available, and composed of 97 countries. Due to 
missing observations the panel is unbalanced. Instrumental variables methodology 
is applied to the models that are estimated with the computer software Ox.
Regression results verify the expectations on control variables. The actual 
and potential size of the economy was found to be positively effectual on FDI. 
However it is reported that GDP per capita affects the FDI flows negatively in 
Africa. The influence of openness on FDI was also observed to be promoting. 
Coefficient of inflation and inflation instability are noted to be negative and 
significant. Additionally, REER was realized to be hampering FDI. What is the 
actual value added to the literature is the outcome of the effects of lagged FDI and 
aid on FDI inflows.
The regression results of the basic model, in which no condition on the 
effects of aid or lagged FDI was imposed, presented negative effects o f aid on 
FDI, and positive returns from lagged FDI. The subsequent model integrated the 
interaction terms of aid and lagged FDI with quality of governance and the 
coefficients of interaction terms were found to be positive, while the aid and 
lagged FDI terms were observed to be negatively influential. These outcomes 
match with the expectations of this study, as they indicate the necessity of 
governance of high performance for aid and lagged FDI to motivate more FDI.
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In place of governance interaction terms, our third model employed the 
interaction terms of aid and lagged FDI with the quality of financial markets. The 
results again supported the hypothesis that more developed financial institutions 
constitutes a basis for aid and lagged FDI to attract more FDI inflows. In lack of 
reliable monetary establishments, financial aid diverts FDI, and previous FDI 
inflows also cause a retreat.
In the final model, in addition to the variables in the basic model, 
governance interaction terms and financial market interaction terms are integrated 
together. While some minor unexpected consequences came up due to high 
correlation among variables, majority of the results were analogous of what had 
been hypothesized; Sound political and financial institutions are essential for 
effective aid and emboldening past FDI. Aid and FDI does not work to amplify 
FDI in an environment where corruption is prevalent, political rights or civil 
liberties are not fully formed, government is outdated and instable, crime is 
widespread, financial bodies are immature and shallow. In contrast, aid and 
lagged FDI cause withdrawal of FDI in such backgrounds.
In conclusion, this study provides robust evidence that high quality of 
governance and financial institutions are required for positive causality from aid 
and past FDI to current FDI inflows. Countries who receive aid and FDI should 
improve their governance and financial markets to be able to attract FDI in the 
following years. If these countries do not strive to develop their governance and 
financial markets, FDI flows will slow down.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: List of abbreviations, derivations, and sources of data
Name Definition
Afr
cGDP
= 1 for countries in Africa; = 0 elsewhere.
Gross domestic product in constant local currency in units. 
Source: WDI Online, NY.GDP.MKTP.KN
Contcorr Control of corruption index. See Govt.
Total of deposit money banks claims in local currency in units. 
CR Source: IMF IFS CD-ROM 1.1.54, 22A..ZF; 22B..ZF; 22C..ZF;
22D..ZF; 22E..MZF; 22F..ZF; 22G..ZF.
CRpr
Dt
Deposit Money Banks Claims on Private Sector in local currency 
in units.
Source: IMF IFS CD-ROM 1.1.54,22D..ZF.
inf,/100 
1 + inf,/100^
dlnREERt "  ]n(REER), -  ]n(REER),_^
The net change in liabilities of foreign direct investment in current 
FDI US dollars in units.
Source; WDI Online, BN.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
FMD
GDP
Financial Market Development.
Gross domestic product in current local currency in units. 
Source: IMF IFS CD-ROM 1.1.54, 99B..ZF
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Name Definition
GDPgrt
cGDPj — cGDP^_^
cGDP,
GDPus
Gross domestic product in current US dollars in units. 
Source: WDI Online, NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
Goveff Governance efficiency index. See Govt.
Govindti
Six governance indices provided for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. 
Source: Kaufman et al. (2003), World Bank
Govt
ju¡ -m in (Q ) 
m ax(r) 
f o r  Q  =
r  = {(//i -m in ( 0 ) ) , ( / / 2  -  min ( Q ) ) , . - m i n ( O ) ) }
HK
Average years of secondary schooling. Data for a country at time t 
is taken to be the same for the subsequent years until the next 
available data point.
Source: Barro and Lee (2000)
IMF IFS International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund
inf
Annual percentage of inflation in consumer prices. 
Source: WDI Online, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG
InGDPpct = ln
f  G D P us, \
[  p o p ,  J
InREER, =  ]n(REER,)
M
Imports of goods and services in local currency in units. 
Source: WDI Online, NE.IMP.GNFS.CN
M2
Money and quasi money in current local currency in units. 
Source: WDI Online, FM.LBL.MQMY.CN
MA« Moving average over n years.
+ Govlnd^g^^^ + Govlnd2oooi + Govlnd^ooz,
Pi 4
81
Name Definition
ODA
The official development assistance and official aid in current US 
dollars in units. Source: WDI Online, DT.ODA.ALLD.CD
_ X , + M ,
opent GDP,
Pols Political stability index. See Govt.
Population in units.
pop Source: WDI Online, SP.POP.TOTL
REER
Real effective exchange rate index for 1995=100 in units. 
Source: IMF
Requal Regulatory quality index. See Govt.
Rule Rule of law index. See Govt.
sCRprt = value of normalized as in Govt.GDP,
sCRt
CR
=  value o f -----— normalized as in Govt.
GDP,
F D I,
sFDIt G D Pus,
sM2t
M 2
= value o f ----- - normalized as in Govt.
GDP,
ODA,
sODAt G D Pus,
a k Standard deviation over k  years.
Voacc Voice and accountability index. See Govt.
WDI Online World Development Indicators Online of the World Bank
X
Exports of goods and services in local currency in units. 
Source: WDI Online, NE.EXP.GNFS.CN
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Appendix B: Explanatory data averages
Continent
Appendix Table B .l: Explanatory data averages of continents
Region sFDI sODA
Africa
Americas
Asia
Australia
Europe
1
2
3
4
5
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.12
0.04
0.05
0.27
0.04
InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
6.01 0.12 -0.03 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.65 0.41
7.51 0.13 -0.02 0.04 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.79 1.25
7.00 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.77 1.16
7.54 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.27 0.54 0.98 1.63
8.23 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.37 0.51 0.47 0.79 2.18
oo
Appendix Table B.2: Explanatory data averages of countries
Code Index Country Region sFDI SODA InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP
DZA 003 Algeria 1 0.00 0.01 7.11 0.09 -0.04 0.04
AGO 004 Angola 1 0.07 0.04 6.52 0.73 0.00 0.03
BEN 019 Benin 1 0.01 0.09 5.57 0.06 -0.01 0.03
BWA 024 Botswana 1 0.02 0.10 6.85 0.10 0.01 0.10
BFA 028 Burkina Faso 1 0.00 0.13 5.11 0.04 -0.02 0.04
BDI 029 Burundi 1 0.00 0.14 4.87 0.09 -0.02 0.03
CMR 031 Cameroon 1 0.01 0.04 6.21 0.07 -0.01 0.04
CPV 033 Cape Verde 1 0.02 0.28 7.00 0.05 0.01 0.06
CAF 035 Central African Republic 1 0.01 0.12 5.47 0.03 -0.03 0.02
TCD 036 Chad 1 0.01 0.11 5.28 0.04 -0.05 0.02
COM 040 Comoros 1 0.01 0.24 6.04 na 0.01 0.02
sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
0.30
0.00
0.17
0.14
0.13
0.07
0.19
na
0.11
0.09
na
0.44
0.00
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.10
0.22
na
0.13
0.11
na
0.57
0.00
0.21
0.26
0.17
0.15
0.18
na
0.17
0.14
na
0.57
0.00
0.47
1.24
0.41
0.30
0.49
na
0.54
0.51
na
0.54
na
0.20
0.37
na
0.13
0.36
na
0.23
na
na
Code Index Country
oo■4^
ZAR 041
COG 042
CIV 044
DJI 050
EGY 054
GNQ 056
ERI 057
ETH 059
GAB 064
GMB 065
GHA 068
GIN 072
GNB 073
KEN 091
LSO 100
LBR 101
LBY 102
MDG 107
MWI 108
MU 111
MRT 114
MUS 115
MYT 116
MAR 121
MOZ 122
NAM 124
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep.
Cote d'Ivoire 
Djibouti
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mayotte
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
sFDI SODA InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
0.00 0.03 5.48 0.42 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.18 na
0.03 0.07 6.46 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.17 0.20 0.18 1.06 1.08
0.01 0.04 6.42 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.69 na
0.00 0.22 6.79 na 0.00 -0.01 na na na na na
0.02 0.06 6.30 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.24 0.51 0.62 0.49 1.09
0.14 0.20 5.95 na -0.04 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 1.22 na
0.04 0.26 5.05 na 0.05 0.06 na na na na na
0.01 0.11 4.86 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.29 na
0.01 0.03 7.94 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.93 na
0.02 0.19 5.49 0.07 -0.03 0.04 na na na na 0.30
0.01 0.06 5.78 0.22 -0.07 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.79
0.01 0.10 6.16 na -0.01 0.04 na na na na na
0.01 0.39 5.22 0.23 -0.09 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.28 na
0.00 0.06 5.59 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.63 0.31
0.07 0.19 5.73 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.24 0.35 1.22 0.22
-0.01 0.20 5.43 na na 0.02 na na na na 0.36
na 0.00 8.50 0.06 -0.07 0.08 0.19 0.27 0.42 0.78 na
0.00 0.08 5.51 0.11 -0.06 0.01 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.45 na
0.01 0.17 4.94 0.19 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.61 0.13
0.01 0.16 5.18 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.51 0.07
0.00 0.20 5.86 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.97 0.28
0.01 0.02 7.70 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.31 0.39 0.51 1.11 0.92
na na na na na na na na na na na
0.01 0.03 6.35 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.21 0.31 0.47 0.52 na
0.02 0.29 5.32 0.22 -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.44 0.54 0.07
na 0.04 7.54 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.36 0.35 1.13 na
Code Index Country
oo
NER 131 Niger
NGA 132 Nigeria
RWA 149 Rwanda
STP 151 Sao Tome and Principe
SEN 153 Senegal
SYC 154 Seychelles
SLE 155 Sierra Leone
SOM 160 Somalia
ZAP 161 South Africa
SDN 167 Sudan
SWZ 169 Swaziland
TZA 174 Tanzania
TGO 177 Togo
TUN 180 Tunisia
UGA 183 Uganda
ZMB 196 Zambia
2\N E  197 Zimbabwe
ATG 005 Antigua and Barbuda
ARG 006 Argentina
ABW 008 Aruba
BHS 012 Bahamas, The
BRB 015 Barbados
BLZ 018 Belize
BMU 020 Bermuda
BOL 022 Bolivia
BRA 025 Brazil
sFDI SODA InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
0.01 0.12 5.44 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.48 0.06
0.02 0.01 5.58 0.14 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.49 na
0.01 0.15 4.94 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.26 0.11
0.01 0.57 5.98 na -0.06 0.02 na na na na na
0.01 0.10 6.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.24 0.27 0.21 0.63 0.26
0.06 0.11 7.39 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.41 0.45 1.36 na
0.00 0.10 5.29 0.18 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.49 0.25
0.00 0.31 4.73 na na 0.03 na na na na na
0.02 0.00 7.57 0.08 0.00 0.03 na na na na 1.26
0.01 0.04 5.75 0.21 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.30 0.24
0.04 0.07 6.55 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.22 0.29 1.60 0.46
0.01 0.18 5.34 0.15 -0.03 0.04 na na na na na
0.01 0.10 5.60 0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.85 0.35
0.02 0.04 6.87 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.68 0.57
0.01 0.10 5.40 0.25 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.37 0.20
0.02 0.11 5.97 0.41 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.84 0.42
0.00 0.03 6.32 0.13 -0.11 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.59 0.58
na 0.02 8.43 na 0.00 0.05 0.49 0.63 0.64 1.63 na
0.01 0.00 8.04 0.37 -0.03 0.02 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.18 1.17
0.04 0.02 na 0.04 na 0.08 na na na na na
0.01 0.00 8.79 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.41 0.51 0.39 1.34 na
0.01 0.01 8.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.50 0.51 1.29 2.75
0.02 0.08 7.14 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.34 0.39 0.43 1.21 na
na 0.00 na na na 0.03 na na na na na
0.03 0.07 6.26 0.18 -0.02 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.56 1.23
0.01 0.00 7.36 0.52 -0.01 0.05 0.25 0.33 0.24 0.17 0.75
Code Index Country
ooα^
CAN 032
CYM 034
CHL 037
COL 039
CRI 043
CUB 046
DMA 051
DOM 052
ECU 053
SLV 055
GRD 070
GTM 071
GUY 074
HTI 075
HND 076
JAM 087
MEX 117
ANT 127
NIC 130
PAN 138
PRY 140
PER 141
PRI 145
KNA 164
LCA 165
VCT 166
Canada
Cayman Islands
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
SL Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Region sFDI sODA InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0.02
na
0.03
0.01
0.02
na
0.07
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.06
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.02
-0.07
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
na
0.14
0.09
0.06
na
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
na
0.13
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.11
0.07
0.06
0.03
0.00
0.06
0.13
0.01
0.02
0.01
na
0.05
na
0.08
9.29
na
7.56 
6.83 
7.31
na
7.51 
6.79 
11.71 
6.64
7.57 
6.76
6.38 
5.45
6.33
7.25
7.62
na
6.24
7.39
6.73 
6.97
8.51
7.39 
7.81
6.73
0.04
na
0.23
0.15
0.11
na
0.05
0.10
0.18
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.09
0.08
0.12
0.17
0.04
0.32
0.03
0.11
0.27
na
0.04
0.06
0.05
- 0.01
na
- 0.02
- 0.02
-0.03
na
0.00
-0.04
-0.03
0.04
0.01
- 0.01
-0.09
0.02
- 0.02
- 0.01
- 0.01
-0.01
-0.31
- 0.02
-0.03
0.05
na
0.05
- 0.01
- 0.01
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.02
0.05
- 0.01
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.07
na
na
0.32
0.15
0.19
na
0.42
0.14
0.16
0.07
0.48
0.14
0.23
0.09
0.20
0.22
na
na
0.27
0.48
0.13
0.12
na
0.57
0.53
0.42
na
na
0.37
0.18
0.23
na
0.56
0.20
0.17
0.08
0.60
0.15
0.42
0.09
0.24
0.31
na
na
0.32
0.51
0.13
0.17
na
0.86
0.60
0.56
na
na
0.29
0.20
0.31
na
0.57
0.23
0.21
0.08
0.68
0.22
0.54
0.25
0.26
0.36
na
na
0.31
0.39
0.21
0.23
na
0.79
0.58
0.62
na
na
0.45
0.30
0.70
na
1.15
0.53
0.50
0.58
1.18
0.39
1.45
0.39
0.68
0.88
na
na
0.64
0.76
0.47
0.37
na
1.36
1.34
1.38
3.51
na
1.55
1.07 
0.85
na
na
0.66
1.08 
0.51
na
0.35
0.78
0.39
0.44
1.00
0.98
na
0.61
1.47
0.85
1.26
na
na
na
na
Code Index Country Region sFDI sODA InGDPpc
oo
SUR 168
TTO 179
USA 187
URY 188
VEN 191
AFG 001
ARM 007
AZE o il
BHR 013
BGD 014
BTN 021
BRN 026
KHM 030
CHN 038
CYP 047
GEO 066
HKG 077
IND 080
IDN 081
IRN 082
IRQ 083
ISR 085
JPN 088
JOR 089
KAZ 090
PRK 093
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB
Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Brunei
Cambodia
China
Cyprus
Georgia
Hong Kong, China 
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Israel
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Korea, Dem. Rep.
dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
na
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.00
na
0.00
0.00
7.24
8.02
9.34
7.69
7.91
0.15
0.07
0.04
0.31
0.14
-0.03
- 0.01
0.00
- 0.01
-0.03
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.26
0.23
na
0.28
0.19
0.30
0.29
na
0.32
0.21
0.59
0.35
na
0.38
0.28
0.93
0.89
na
0.35
0.51
na
1.53
4.13
1.50
0.87
3 na 0.03 5.04 na na 0.02 na na na na 0.26
3 0.04 0.09 6.47 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.80 na
3 0.12 0.05 5.89 0.37 0.01 0.00 na na na na na
3 na 0.02 9.14 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.43 0.48 0.62 1.78 1.00
3 0.00 0.05 5.32 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.14 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.43
3 0.00 0.15 6.08 0.09 na 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.27 0.70 na
3 na 0.00 9.53 na 0.00 0.02 na na na na na
3 0.03 0.10 5.13 0.04 -0.03 0.05 na na na na na
3 0.03 0.00 5.54 0.07 -0.06 0.08 0.93 0.96 0.85 0.31 1.30
3 0.02 0.02 8.60 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.59 0.66 0.72 1.05 1.81
3 0.03 0.07 6.52 0.16 na 0.01 na na na na na
3 na 0.00 8.36 0.04 na 0.07 1.53 1.63 1.88 2.07 2.55
3 0.00 0.01 5.47 0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.35 0.15 0.56
3 0.01 0.02 5.96 0.20 -0.04 0.06 0.31 0.40 0.27 0.45 0.57
3 0.00 0.00 7.63 0.12 -0.05 0.03 0.22 0.25 0.41 0.40 0.73
3 na 0.00 7.16 na na 0.01 na na na na 0.54
3 0.01 0.03 8.63 0.20 -0.01 0.06 0.58 0.83 0.61 0.79 1.74
3 0.00 na 8.89 0.04 0.02 0.05 na na na na 2.50
3 0.01 0.14 7.06 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.44 0.50 0.82 1.22 1.27
3 0.06 0.01 7.30 0.27 0.06 -0.01 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.83 na
3 na na na na na na na na na na na
oooo
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Lebanon 
Macao, China 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Qatar
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
United Arab Emirates 
Uzbekistan
Code Index Country
KOR 094
KWT 095
KGZ 096
LAO 097
LBN 099
MAC 105
MYS 109
MDV 110
MNG 120
MMR 123
NPL 125
OMN 135
PAK 136
PHL 142
QAT 146
SAU 152
SGP 156
LKA 163
SYR 172
TJK 173
THA 175
TMP 176
TUR 181
TKM 182
ARE 185
UZB 189
Region sFDI sODA InGDPpc D dlnREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
3 0.00 0.01 7.51 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.55 2.35
3 0.00 0.00 9.26 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.49 0.63 0.62 0.97 2.33
3 0.03 0.13 5.90 0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.82 na
3 0.02 0.14 5.73 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.45 na
3 0.01 0.03 7.69 na 0.06 0.04 na na na na na
3 na 0.00 9.15 na na 0.05 0.70 0.71 1.26 1.57 na
3 0.04 0.01 7.13 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.46 0.58 0.57 1.22 1.34
3 0.02 0.12 6.91 0.09 na 0.05 na na na na na
3 0.03 0.24 5.94 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.25 0.26 1.06 na
3 na na na 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.27 0.15 0.44
3 0.00 0.07 4.94 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.33 0.25
3 0.01 0.01 7.86 0.00 -0.04 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.91 na
3 0.00 0.03 5.60 0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.23 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.71
3 0.01 0.01 6.16 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.26 0.33 0.32 0.54 1.20
3 na 0.00 9.62 0.03 0.00 na 0.31 0.36 0.42 0.80 na
3 na 0.00 8.46 0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.17 0.20 0.33 0.88 na
3 0.09 0.00 8.27 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.72 0.84 0.76 na 1.55
3 0.01 0.05 5.91 0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.72 1.57
3 0.00 0.04 6.73 0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.47 0.51 0.79
3 0.01 0.08 5.90 na 0.27 -0.03 na na na na na
3 0.01 0.01 6.39 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.43 0.53 0.52 0.59 0.56
3 na 0.45 6.08 na na -0.01 na na na na na
3 0.00 0.00 7.35 0.25 -0.01 0.04 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.63
3 0.03 0.01 6.75 na -0.30 0.01 na na na na na
3 na 0.00 9.83 na 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.42 0.43 1.12 1.11
3 0.00 0.01 6.51 na -0.04 0.01 na na na na na
Code Index Country
VNM 192 Vietnam
WBG 193 West Bank and Gaza
YEM 194 Yemen, Rep.
ooVO
AUS 009
FJI 060
PYF 063
KIR 092
MHL 113
FSM 118
NCL 128
NZL 129
MNP 133
PLW 137
PNG 139
WSM 150
SLB 159
TON 178
VUT 190
ALB 002
AUT 010
BLR 016
BEL 017
BIH 023
BGR 027
HRV 045
CZE 048
Australia
Fiji
French Polynesia 
Kiribati
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Northern Mariana Islands 
Palau
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Vanuatu
Albania
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
igion sFDI sODA InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR SM2 sXnM HK
3 0.04 0.03 5.60 0.03 -0.12 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.87 na
3 na 0.17 7.16 na na -0.01 na na na na na
3 0.01 0.05 5.99 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.47 0.65 na
4 0.02 na 9.02 0.05 0.00 0.04 na na na na 2.90
4 0.02 0.03 7.15 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.22 0.26 0.39 1.02 0.77
4 na 0.10 8.93 na na 0.04 na na na na na
4 na 0.39 6.24 na -0.01 0.01 na na na na na
4 na 0.48 7.32 na 0.04 0.03 na na na na na
4 na 0.39 7.44 na na 0.02 na na na na na
4 na 0.12 8.87 na na 0.04 na na na na na
4 0.03 na 8.72 0.06 0.01 0.03 na na na na 2.66
4 na na na na na na na na na na na
4 na 0.65 8.74 na na 0.01 na na na na na
4 0.03 0.14 6.38 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.19 0.28 0.33 0.87 0.18
4 0.01 0.26 6.83 0.07 -0.02 0.04 na na na na na
4 0.03 0.23 6.15 0.10 -0.02 0.04 na na na na na
4 0.01 0.22 6.83 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.26 0.86 na
4 0.08 0.24 6.98 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.34 0.38 1.16 1.17 na
5 0.02 0.13 6.57 0.19 0.02 0.02 na na na na na
5 0.01 na 8.85 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.68 0.87 na 0.05 4.02
5 0.01 0.01 7.48 0.62 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.21 1.27 na
5 0.02 na 8.94 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.62 na 0.03 1.79
5 0.02 0.26 6.79 na -0.03 0.23 0.52 0.52 na 0.93 na
5 0.02 0.02 7.49 0.28 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.66 0.56 0.90 na
5 0.04 0.00 8.25 0.38 0.06 0.00 0.38 0.57 0.37 1.03 na
5 0.05 0.00 8.40 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.63 0.72 0.71 1.20 na
Code Index Country
VO
o
DNK 049
EST 058
FIN 061
FRA 062
DEU 067
GRC 069
HUN 078
ISL 079
IRL 084
ITA 086
LVA 098
LTU 103
LUX 104
MKD 106
MLT 112
MDA 119
NLD 126
NOR 134
POL 143
PRT 144
ROM 147
RUS 148
SVK 157
SVN 158
ESP 162
SWE 170
Region sFDI sODA InGDPpc D dInREER grGDP sCRpr sCR sM2 sXnM HK
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia, FYR
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
0.02
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.04
0.03
na
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
na
0.01
na
na
na
na
0.01
na
na
na
0.01
0.01
na
0.04
0.04
0.04
na
na
0.01
na
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
na
na
9.17
8.16
8.95 
9.01 
9.49
8.13
7.63 
9.15 
8.47 
8.66
7.95
7.89 
9.28
7.51
7.90 
6.55
8.95 
9.23
8.04 
7.82
7.35 
7.84
8.08
9.05
8.25
9.25
0.05
0.15
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.09
0.10
0.15
0.06
0.07
0.19
0.19
0.04
0.08
0.03
0.14
0.04
0.05
0.19
0.09
0.44
0.39
0.08
0.11
0.08
0.05
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.08
0.04
0.00
-0.03
- 0.01
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
- 0.02
0.07
0.02
- 0.01
0.00
- 0.01
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
- 0.01
0.04
0.00
0.06
- 0.02
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.38
0.20
0.53
na
na
0.37
0.30
0.43
0.40
na
0.16
0.13
0.88
na
0.56
0.12
na
0.46
0.16
0.70
0.31
na
0.48
0.31
na
0.43
0.46
0.29
0.55
na
na
0.55
0.37
0.45
0.52
na
0.24
0.18
0.91
na
0.66
0.25
na
0.59
0.25
0.84
0.52
na
0.63
0.42
na
0.63
0.51
0.41
na
na
na
na
0.48
0.34
na
na
0.29
0.22
na
na
1.51
0.27
na
0.54
0.42
na
0.35
na
0.63
0.40
na
na
0.64
1.60
0.09
na
na
0.00
0.81
0.75
1.39
na
1.05
1.04
0.05
na
1.63
1.22
na
0.76
0.53
0.00
0.58
na
1.27
1.20
na
0.60
3.34 
na
2.27
2.34 
4.64 
1.43 
0.99 
1.81
2.14 
1.71
na
na
na
na
1.20
na
2.14 
2.87
1.20 
0.94
na
na
na
na
1.26
3.52
Code Index Country
CHE 171 Switzerland
UKR 184 Ukraine
Region sFDI sQDA InGDPpc
5 0.02 na 9.36
5 0.01 0.01 6.97
dInREER grGDP sXnM
VO
Appendix С: Cross correlations
40Ю
МАЗ (SODA) 1 a 1.00 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.68 0.73 0.72 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09 -0.34
u
-0.33
e
0.23
T
0.02
g
0.07
n
0.00
I
0.01
J
-0.06
МАЗ (SODA ж Pols) 1 aa 0.91 1.00 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.75 0.77 0.76 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.32 -0.28 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00
МАЗ (SODA ж Rule) t ab 0.87 0.92 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.29 -0.26 0.19 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.16 -0.01
МАЗ (sODA ж Corrtcorr) 1 ac 0.90 0.94 ^ .9 6 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.73 0.76 0.74 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.28 -0.24 0.17 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.13 -0.01
МАЗ (sODA ж Regual) t ad 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.72 0.78 0.76 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.33 -0.33 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.04
МАЗ (SODA ж Goveff) t ae 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.90 0.75 0.78 0.76 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.30 -0.29 0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.02
МАЗ (sODA ж Voacc) 1 af 0.89 0.94 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 1.00 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.29 -0.20 0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.13 -0.05
МАЗ (SODA ж sM2) t ag 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.77 1.00 0.85 0.82 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.08 0.06 -0.17 -0.17 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.24 0.00
МАЗ (SODA ж sCR) t ah 0.73 0.77 0.83 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.85 1.00 0.95 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.10 -0.15 -0.18 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.28 -0.02
МАЗ (SODA ж sCRpr) 1 ai 0.72 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.95 1.00 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.10 -0.17 -0.18 0.10 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.25 0.00МАЗ (sFDI) t-1 b -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.09 1.00 0.94 0.78 0.70 0.91 0.81 0.82 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.10 0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 0.39 0.16МАЗ (sFDI ж Pols) И ba -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.94 1.00 0.84 0.75 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.69 0.66 0.19 0.18 -0.06 -0.20 -0.13 -0.12 0.39 0.22
МАЗ (sFDI ж Rule) t-1 bb -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.78 0.84 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.26 0.31 -0.17 -0.22 -0.18 -0.14 0.44 0.12
МАЗ (sFDI ж Conlcorr) t-1 be -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.70 0.75 0.98 1.00 0.91 0.98 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.28 0.33 -0.17 -0.21 -0.19 -0.14 0.41 0.09
МАЗ (sFDI ж Regual) t-1 bd -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.91 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.19 0.23 -0.14 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 0.43 0.15
МАЗ (sFDI ж Goveff) t-1 be -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.81 0.85 0.99 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.24 0.29 -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 0.43 0.13
MA3 (sFDI ж Voacc) t-1 bf -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.92 1.00 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.23 0.25 -0.18 -0.20 -0.16 -0.12 0.42 0.08MA3 (sFDI X sM2) 1-1 bg -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.89 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.23 0.26 -0.16 -0.22 -0.20 -0.12 0.48 0.14MA3 (sFDI ж sCR) t-1 bh -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.68 0.69 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.25 0.27 -0.16 -0.21 -0.20 -0.12 0.40 0.11
MA3 (sFDI ж sCRpr) t-1 bi -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.66 0.66 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.91 0.98 1.00 0.23 0.27 -0.18 -0.21 -0.20 -0.11 0.38 0.12MA3 (human capital) t c -0.34 -0.32 -0.29 -0.28 -0.33 -0.30 -0.29 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 1.00 0.77 -0.43 -0.17 -0.25 -0.20 0.17 -0.10MA3 (InGDPpc) t d -0.33 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.33 -0.29 -0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 0.11 0.18 0.31 0.33 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.77 1.00 -0.41 -0.14 -0.26 -0.17 0.23 -0.04MA3 (InGDPpc ж Afr) t e 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.43 -0.41 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.15 -0.02 -0.02M A3(D)t f 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.17 -0.14 0.02 1.00 0.60 0.05 -0.16 -0.26STD5 (D) t g 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13 -0.18 -0.19 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.25 -0.26 0.06 0.60 1.00 0.06 -0.13 -0.16MA3 (InREER) t h 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 4).08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.20 -0.17 0.15 0.05 0.06 1.00 -0.05 -0.05MA3 (openness) t t 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.17 0.23 -0.02 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 1.00 0.12MA3 (gcGDP) t i -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.12 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.26 -0.16 -0.05 0.12 1.00
Appendix D: Regression results with human capital
Appendix Table D.l: Regression results of the model (4.1.2) with MA3HK 
Introducing the interaction terms of MASsODA and MASsFDI with Gov
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory
Variables; Gov = Pols Rule Contcorr Requal Goveff Voacc
(MA3SODA) 
(MASsODA X Gov) 
(MA3sFDI)(-1) 
(MA3SFDI X Gov) 
(MA3HK)
(MA3D)
(aSD)
(MA3lnREER)
(MA3open)
(MA3grGDP)
Constant
-0.16***
(-8.51)
0.24***
(7.44)
-0.44***
(-15.00)
1.22***
(29.10)
0.01***
( 10.20)
-0.02***
(-21.20)
-0.01***
(-7.52)
-0.004***
(-4.89)
0.02***
(15.30)
0.04***
(6.78)
0.0004***
(5.70)
-0.22***
(-6 .66)
0.57***
(6.12)
-0.18***
(-5.83)
0.97***
(13.90)
0.01***
(9.90)
-0.02***
(-21.70)
-0.02***
(-11.80)
-0.01***
(-7.12)
0.02***
(15.90)
0.04***
(5.67)
0.0004***
(5.66)
No. of observation 
Wald üoint)
Wald (dummy)
Wald (MA3SODA terms) 
Wald (MA3sFDI terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
1013
14050
[0 .00]
32.54
[0.00]
93.74
[0 .00]
3226
[0.00]
63.67
[1.00]
0.03
[0.98]
1013
10520
[0 .00]
32.06
[0 .00]
52.77
[0.00]
1724
[0 .00]
63.18
[1.00]
0.13
[0.89]
-0.23***
( -8.01)
0.75***
(7.46)
0.08***
(3.37)
0.50***
(8.45)
0.01***
(14.30)
-0.02***
(-23.40)
-0.02***
(-10.80)
-0.005***
(-6.65)
0.02***
(26.50)
0.04***
(6.24)
0.0004***
(6.40)
1013
42300
[0 .00]
40.92
[0 .00]
65.68
[0 .00]
2133
[0.00]
61.85
[1.00]
0.21
[0.84]
-0.56***
(-16.40)
0.96***
(14.20)
-1.35***
(-37.80)
2.46***
(49.60)
0.01***
(10.60)
-0.02***
( -11.10)
-0.01***
(-8.94)
-0.005***
( -10.10)
0.02***
(25.20)
0.04***
(7.96)
0.0005***
(11.10)
1013
16640
[0.00]
122.40
[0 .00]
493.20
[0.00]
4455
[0.00]
61.62
[1.00]
- 0.22
[0.83]
-0.29***
(-9.00)
0.71***
(8.10)
-0.38***
(-14.50)
1.36***
(26.40)
0.01***
( 12.20)
-0.02***
(-15.70)
-0.02***
(-12.90)
-0.005***
(-7.02)
0.02***
(20 .20)
0.04***
(5.34)
0.0004***
(5.56)
1013
18090
[0 .00]
30.88
[0 .00]
146.30
[0 .00]
2173
[0 .00]
60.52
[ 1.00]
0.12
[0.90]
-0.14***
(-9.76)
0.23***
(7.78)
-0.38***
(-18.40)
1 1 Q***
(2920)
0.01***
(12.40)
-0.02***
(-18.80)
-0.01***
(-6.59)
-0.004***
(-5.24)
0.02***
(17.50)
0.04***
(7.61)
0.0003***
(5.13)
1013
13790
[0 .00]
26.32
[0 .00]
137.90
[0.00]
1473
[0.00]
64.11
[ 1.00]
-0.07
[0.94]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except
MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the {n 
MA3sFDI.
+ 1) and all subsequent lags of
93
Appendix Table D.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.3) with MA3HK
Introducing the interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI with FMD
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0.03***(-3.95)
-0.004
(-0 .66)
-0.04***
(-5.16)
(MA3SODA X FMD) -0.03**(-2 .21)
-0.14***
(-3.29)
0.32***
(9.76)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) 0.07***(4.85)
0 .12***
(16.50)
0.15***
(10.80)
(MA3sFDI X FMD)(-1) 1.27*** (12.00)
1.32***
(16.80)
1.00***
(14.30)
(MA3HK) 0.005***(4.42)
0 .01***
(5.95)
0 .01***
(8.31)
(MA3D) -0 .02***(-16.20)
-0 .01***
(-15.30)
-0 .01***
(-9.49)
(g5D) -0 .02*** -0 .02*** -0 .01***(-8.30) (-6.80) (-6.89)
(MA3lnREER) -0 .01***(-5.97)
-0 .01***
(-6 .88)
-0.005***
(-12.30)
(MASopen) 0 .02***(30.90)
0 .02***
(17.90)
0 .02***
(17.10)
(MA3grGDP) 0.06***(8.53)
0.08***
(10.90)
0.08***
(11.00)
Constant 0 .0002***(3.31)
0 .0002**
(2.16)
0 .0002***
(3.14)
No. of Observations 1011 1003 1003
Wald (Joint) 21020[0 .00]
12330
[0 .00]
16810
[0 .00]
Wald (Dummy) 10.95[0 .00]
4.65
[0.03]
9.84
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3SODA terms) 73.61[0 .00]
150
[0 .00]
111.20
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3sFDI terms) 2669[0 .00]
3208
[0 .00]
3396
[0 .00]
Sargan test 63.10[1.00]
64.72
[1.00]
63.09
[1.00]
m2 test 0.28 0.25 0.19[0.78] [0.80] [0.85]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level and ** indicates significance at 5% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the (a7 + 1)  ^and all subsequent lags of MA3sFDI.
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Appendix Table D.3.1: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK
Introducing Pols and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables; FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0 .12***(-7.31)
-0.17***
(-11.60)
-0.17***
(-6.78)
(MA3sODA X Pols) 0.18***(5.29)
0.32***
(11.40)
0.26***
(4.99)
(MA3SODA X FMD) -0.02(-1.33)
-0.09*
(-1.84)
0.28***
(4.48)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -0.62***(-22.50)
-0.50***
(-29.30)
-0.46***
(-17.20)
(MA3sFDIxPols)(-1) 1.10***(28.00)
1.01***
(18.50)
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) J'92*) 0.89***(6.37)
0.92***
(7.42)
(MA3HK) 0 .01***(5.89)
0 .01***
(5.41)
0 .01***
(8.18)
(MA3D) -0 .02***(-22.60)
-0 .02***
(-14.80)
-0 .01***
(-20 .10)
(a5D) -0 .01***(-5.90)
-0 .01***
(-7.18)
-0 .01***
(-6.80)
(MA3lnREER) -0.004***(-4.10)
-0.004***
(-3.73)
-0.005***
(-7.76)
(MA3open) 0 .02***(16.60)
0 .02***
(12.60)
0 .02***
(11.60)
(MA3grGDP) 0.04***(5.77)
0.04***
(4.31)
0.05***
(6.43)
Constant 0.0004***(7.19)
0.0003***
(4.00)
0.0003***
(4.40)
No. of Observations 1011 1003 1003
Wald (Joint) 9829[0 .00]
9621
[0 .00]
22100
[0 .00]
Wald (Dummy) 51.65[0 .00]
16.03
[0 .00]
19.35
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3SODA terms) ^^ 09° 140.50[0 .00]
315.70
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 3015[0 .00]
4206
[0 .00]
Sargan test 61.39[1.00]
57.07
[1.00]
61.35
[1.00]
m2 test 0.00[1.00]
0.05
[0.96]
0.02
[0.98]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, * indicates significance at 10% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the in  + 1)'*’ and all subsequent lags of MASsFDI.
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Appendix Table D.3.2: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK
Introducing Rule and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0.27***(-6.25)
-0.25***
(-4.73)
-0.25***
(-5.18)
(MA3SODA X Rule) 0.80***(6.18)
0.79***
(4.26)
0.67***
(4.61)
(MA3sODA X FMD) -0 .22***(-4.95)
-0.22
(-1.03)
0.29***
(6.87)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -0.39***(-8.94)
-0.25***
(-5.70)
-0.27***
(-7.32)
(MA3sFDIxRule)(-1) 0.59***(7.58)
0.52***
(4.73)
(MA3SFDI X FM D)(-1 ) 1.67***(3.67)
1.88***
(12.50)
(MA3HK) o .o r * *(4.73)
0.003***
(2.97)
0 .01***
(7.30)
(MA3D) -0 .02 ’^ *^(-17.60)
-0 .02***
(-10.80)
-0 .02***
(-16.10)
(a5D) -0 .02 *^ * -0 .01*** -0 .01***(-11.20) (-3.49) (-4.65)
(MA3lnREER) -0.004***(-4.55)
-0.003
(-0.97)
-0.005**
(-2.16)
(MA3open) 0 .02***(10.80)
0 .02***
(6 .22)
0 .01***
(6.94)
(MA3grGDP) 0.03***(4.67)
0.05***
(8.27)
0.05***
(5.92)
Constant 0.0005***(7.30)
0 .001***
(4.16)
0.0003***
(3.02)
No. of Observations 1011 1003 1003
Wald (Joint) 7395[0 .00]
3170
[0 .00]
5383
[0 .00]
Wald (Dummy) 53.34[0 .00]
17.31
[0 .00]
9.10
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3SODA terms) 35.49[0 .00]
78.41
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 1257[0 .00]
1279
[0 .00]
Sargan test 59.01[1.00]
62.92
[1.00]
57.17
[1.00]
m2 test
0.19 0.18 0.09
[0.85] [0.85] [0.93]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; indicates 
significance at 1% level and ♦* indicates significance at 5% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDl(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the ( n +  1)‘‘‘ and all subsequent lags of MA3sFDl.
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Introducing Contcorr and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and
MA3sFDI
Appendix Table D.3.3: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MASsODA) -0.23***(-4.98)
-0.25***
(-7.21)
-0.28***
(-7.99)
(MA3sODA X Contcorr) 0.89***(5.02)
1.04***
(7.03)
0.99***
(7.17)
(MA3SODA X FMD) -0.25***(-6.06)
-0.40***
(-3.01)
0.19***
(3.91)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -0.16***(-4.51)
-0 .12***
(-3.00)
-0.15***
(-5.87)
(MA3sFDI X Contcorr)(-1) 0.52***(6.60)
0.30***
(4.64)
0.26***
(3.35)
(MA3SFDI xFMD)(-1) 1.39***(7.66)
1.96***
(8.60)
1.95***
(18.20)
(MA3HK) 0 .01***(7.54)
0 .01***
(5.14)
0 .01***
(9.66)
(MA3D) -0 .02***(-20.60)
-0 .02***
(-17.70)
-0 .02***
(-19.30)
(a5D) -0 .02***(-11.60)
-0 .02***
(-5.98)
-0 .01***
(-4.76)
(MA3lnREER) -0.003***(-5.11)
-0.004***
(-2.83)
-0.004***
(-2.35)
(MA3open) 0 .02***(20.60)
0 .01***
(11.70)
0 .01***
(14.60)
(MA3grGDP) 0.04***(6.49)
0.05***
(8.97)
0.05***
(6.57)
Constant 0.0004***(7.14)
0.0005***
(4.49)
0.0004***
(3.93)
No. of Observations 1011 1003 1003
Wald (Joint) 7538[0 .00]
3553
[0 .00]
9933
[0 .00]
Wald (Dummy) 51.03[0 .00]
20.14
[0 .00]
15.48
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 41.18[0 .00]
55.99
[0 .00]
91.90
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3sFDI terms) 2054[0 .00]
1031
[0 .00]
2768
[0 .00]
Sargan test 59.55[1.00]
61.13
[1.00]
56.70
[1.00]
m2 test
0.25
[0.80]
0.24
[0.81]
0.13
[0.90]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except 
MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the (/? + 1)  ^ and all subsequent lags of 
MA3sFDI.
97
Appendix Table D.3.4: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK
Introducing Requal and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA)
(MA3sODA X Requal) 
(MA3sODA X FMD) 
(MA3sFDI)(-1) 
(MA3SFDI X Requal)(-1) 
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) 
(MA3HK)
(MA3D)
(g5D)
(MA3lnREER)
(MA3open)
(MA3grGDP)
Constant
No. of Observations 
Wald (Joint)
Wald (Dummy)
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 
Wald (MA3sFDI terms) 
Sargan test 
m2 test
-0.50***
(-11.50)
-0.54***
(-7.04)
-0.54***
(-7.65)
0.84***
(8 .68)
0.96***
(5.99)
0.89***
(6.47)
-0.09
(-1.62)
-0.29*
(-1.79)
0.19**
(2.04)
-1.43***
(-30.40)
-1.19***
(-24.80)
-1.18***
(-30.20)
2.36***
(29.30)
2 .02***
(33.80)
1.98***
(28.50)
0.96***
(5.51)
0.99***
(3.97)
1.04***
(9.70)
0 .01***
(6.24)
0 .01***
(5.65)
0 .01***
(7.95)
-0 .02***
(-9.13)
-0 .02***
(-8.32)
-0 .01***
(-9.57)
-0 .01***
(-6.35)
-0 .01***
(-2.64)
-0 .01**
(-2.08)
-0.003***
(-2.89)
-0.002
(-1.57)
-0.003***
(-2.34)
0 .02***
(25.70)
0 .02***
(22 .20)
0 .02***
(19.70)
0.03***
(4.54)
0.03***
(3.58)
0.03***
(4.02)
0.0004***
(6.24)
0.0004***
(5.39)
0.0004***
(5.41)
1011 1003 1003
20800
[0 .00]
11050
[0 .00]
9513
[0 .00]
38.98
[0 .00]
29.08
[0 .00]
29.23
[0 .00]
584.70
[0 .00]
173.60
[0 .00]
288.40
[0 .00]
4982
[0 .00]
2652
[0 .00]
3868
[0 .00]
53.95
[1.00]
55.34
[1.00]
57.44
[1 .00]
-0.19
[0.85]
-0.13
[0.90]
-0.18
[0.85]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, ♦* indicates significance at 5% level and * indicates significance at 10% 
level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and 
GMM-type instrument includes the (« + 1)'*' and all subsequent lags of MASsFDI.
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Appendix Table D.3.5: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK
Introducing Goveff and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0.32***(-5.79)
-0.40***
(-8.26)
-0.36***
(-8.90)
(MASsODA X Goveff) 0 .86***(5.73)
1.14***
(8.29)
0.90***
(7.91)
(MASsODA X FMD) -0.26***(-4.99)
-0.45***
(-3.90)
0 .22***
(3.05)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -0.48***(-10.80)
-0.41***
(-9.95)
-0.42***
(-12.70)
(MA3SFDI X Goveff)(-1) 1.19***(12.80)
0.74***
(11.90)
0.78***
(9.03)
(MA3sFDIxFMD)(-1) 1.15***(7.50)
2.32***
(13.60)
1.91***
(27.90)
(MA3HK) 0 .01***(6.15)
0 .01***
(5.06)
0 .01***
(8.38)
(MA3D) -0 .02***(-13.50)
-0 .02***
(-13.00)
-0 .01***
(-11.70)
(a5D) -0 .02*** -0 .01*** -0 .01***(-11.80) (-5.53) (-4.72)
(MA3lnREER) -0.004***(-5.34)
-0.005***
(-4.81)
-0.005***
(-2.55)
(MA3open) 0 .02***(16.00)
0 .02***
(10.80)
0 .01***
(12.90)
(MA3grGDP) 0.03***(4.66)
0.04***
(4.77)
0.04***
(5.31)
Constant 0.0004***(6.49)
0.0004***
(4.48)
0.0003***
(2.97)
No. of Observations 1011 1003 1003
Wald (Joint) 11550[0 .00]
8631
[0 .00]
9149
[0 .00]
Wald (Dummy) 42.08[0 .00]
20.06
[0 .00]
8.84
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 43.73[0 .00]
98.18
[0 .00]
116.90
[0 .00]
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 3421[0 .00]
903.10
[0 .00]
2640
[0 .00]
Sargan test 56.80[1.00]
58.20
[1.00]
55.85
[1.00]
mz test 0.17 0.17 0.08[0.87] [0.87] [0.94]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. Instrument variables are the explanatory variables in each column except
MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes the {n 
MA3sFDI.
+ 1) and all subsequent lags of
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Appendix Table D.3.6: Regression results of the model (4.1.4) with MA3HK
Introducing Voacc and FMD interaction terms of MA3sODA and MA3sFDI
Dependent Variable: sFDI
Explanatory variables: FMD = M2 sCR sCRpr
(MA3SODA) -0.09***(-3.73)
-0.14***
(-6.81)
-0.12***
(-5.25)
(MASsODA X Voacc) 0.11***(2.39)
0.27***
(7.22)
0.17***
(3.59)
(MASsODA X FMD) -0.03*(-1.82)
-0.09*
(-1.89)
0.32***
(7.24)
(MA3sFDI)(-1) -0.59***(-25.70)
-0.47***
(-27.50)
-0.45***
(-17.50)
(MASsFDI X Voacc)(-1) 1.35***(31.30)
1.08*** 
(31.00)
0.99***
(25.20)
(MA3SFDI X FMD)(-1) 0.75***(5.86)
1.18***
(14.60)
1.18***
(15.00)
(MA3HK) 0.01***(8.02)
0.01***
(7.23)
0.01***
(9.65)
(MA3D) -0.02***(-20.50)
-0.02***
(-15.40)
-0.01***
(-17.50)
(ct5D) -0.01***(-5.66)
-0.01***
(-3.73)
-0.01***
(-4.75)
(MA3lnREER) -0.004***(-4.54)
-0.004***
(-2.93)
-0.01***
(-6.35)
(MA3open) 0.02***(21.40)
0.02***
(11.00)
0.02***
(12.20)
(MA3grGDP) 0.04***(7.04)
0.05***
(5.61)
0.06***
(8.02)
Constant 0.0003***(5.85)
0.0003***
(4.39)
0.0002***
(3.39)
No. of Observations 1011 1003 1003
Wald (Joint) 12830[0.00]
11790
[0.00]
19670
[0.00]
Wald (Dummy) 34.26[0.00]
19.28
[0.00]
11.47
[0.00]
Wald (MA3sODA terms) 124.20[0.00]
87.38
[0.00]
104.20
[0.00]
Wald (MA3SFDI terms) 2657[0.00]
2010
[0.00]
2598
[0.00]
Sargan test 59.91[1.00]
60.61
[1.00]
62.47
[1.00]
m2 test -0.08[0.93]
-0.03
[0.97]
-0.06
[0.95]
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the p-values; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level, * indicates significance at 10% level. Instrument variables are the 
explanatory variables in each column except MA3sFDI(-l); and GMM-type instrument includes 
the ( n +  1)* and all subsequent lags of MASsFDI.
1 0 0
